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CHAPTER	ONE	
	
BACKGROUND	TO	THE	STUDY	
	
	
1.1	 Introduction	
Corruption	generally	is	regarded	as	one	of	the	most	serious	obstacles	to	development.1	It	is	
endemic	in	many	African	countries	and	is	being	blamed	increasingly	for	weak	economic	
growth,	high	socio-economic	inequalities	and	poverty.	Zimbabwe,	over	the	years,	has	
experienced	a	surge	in	the	level	of	corruption,	increased	state	violence	and	a	rapidly	
declining	economy.	
The	country	has	taken	measures	to	try	and	curb	corruption.	At	the	centre	of	
Zimbabwe’s	anti-corruption	efforts	is	the	Zimbabwe	Anti-Corruption	Commission	(ZACC).	Its	
primary	function	is	to	combat	corruption	in	the	private	and	public	sectors.	It	makes	
recommendations	to	the	government	and	the	private	sector	about	increasing	
accountability,	promoting	integrity	and	preventing	improprieties.2	It	was	established	in	2005	
in	terms	of	Chapter	13,	Part	1	of	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe	and	the	Zimbabwe	Anti-
Corruption	Commission	Act	of	2004.	In	addition	to	constitutional	provisions	that	promote	
the	fight	against	corruption,	Zimbabwe	is	a	signatory	to	many	regional	and	international	
anti-corruption	instruments.	These	include	the	Southern	African	Development	Community	
Protocol	against	Corruption	(SADC	Protocol),	which	was	signed	in	2001	and	ratified	in	2003;	
the	African	Union	Convention	on	Preventing	and	Combating	Corruption	(AU	Convention),	
signed	in	2003	and	ratified	in	2006;	and	the	United	Nations	Convention	against	Corruption	
(UNCAC)	of	2005,	ratified	in	2007.	
Despite	the	establishment	of	the	ZACC,	corruption	continues	to	be	rife	in	Zimbabwe.	
The	country	continues	to	be	ravaged	by	multiple	corruption	scandals	that	negatively	affect	
the	nation’s	economy.	In	2016,	it	was	revealed	that	US$15	billion	worth	of	diamonds	were	
syphoned	out	of	the	country	through	corruption.3	This	is	almost	three	times	Zimbabwe’s	
																																								 																				
1	 Lederman	et	al	(2006)	at	27.	
2	 Section	255	of	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe,	2013.	
3	 Kuwaza	(2016),	available	at	https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/03/11/mugabe-interview-
confirms-chiadzwa-diamond-looting/	(visited	18	March	2018).		
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annual	budget,	making	it	the	biggest	corruption	scandal	ever	to	hit	the	country.4	Despite	the	
extensive	legal	and	institutional	framework	available	to	deal	with	corruption,	no	arrests	
have	been	made	for	grand	corruption.	
A	critical	evaluation	of	the	ZACC	and	the	laws	that	govern	the	institution	thus	is	
necessary	for	understanding	why	corruption	continues	to	plague	Zimbabwe.	This	research	
paper	will	analyse	the	history	of	the	ZACC’s	establishment.	It	will	evaluate	the	problems	that	
inhibit	the	ZACC	from	realising	its	mandate.	The	research	will	end	by	making	
recommendations	relating	to	areas	that	need	to	be	improved	to	enable	the	ZACC	to	be	an	
effective	anti-corruption	agency.	
1.2	 Problem	Statement	
Zimbabwe	remains	amongst	the	world’s	most	corrupt	countries.	In	the	2017	Transparency	
International	Corruption	Perceptions	Index	(CPI),	where	zero	represents	“highly	corrupt”,	
and	100	indicates	“very	clean”,	Zimbabwe	scored	22	out	of	100.	This	is	a	substantial	
decrease	from	a	CPI	score	of	42	in	1998.	Currently,	Zimbabwe	ranks	at	157	of	180	countries,	
with	first	place	signifying	the	least	corrupt	and	180th	place	the	most	corrupt.5	The	high	
levels	of	corruption	have	become	an	accepted	way	of	life	for	some	Zimbabweans.	As	Tizor	
argues:	
With	the	Zimbabwean	economy	in	the	doldrums,	corruption	has	become	an	
accepted	and	almost	expected	way	of	doing	business	especially	in	the	public	sector.	
If	a	civil	servant	still	goes	to	work	today,	it	is	not	because	of	the	salary	but	the	
opportunities	to	enhance	his	paltry	income	with	corrupt	acts	using	the	
organisation’s	resources.6	
Zimbabwe	loses	an	estimated	US$1	billion	annually	to	corruption,7	with	the	police	and	local	
government	officials	among	the	worst	offenders.	These	statistics	show	that	the	ZACC	has	
been	ineffective.	Even	more	shocking	is	that	since	its	inception	in	2005,	the	ZACC	has	had	no	
successful	case	prosecutions,	despite	corruption	having	a	grip	on	the	country.	
																																								 																				
4	 Mdzungairi	(2017),	available	at	https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/12/2018-national-budget-
highlights/	(visited	18	March	2018).	
5	 Transparency	International	Corruption	Perceptions	Index	(2017).	
6	 Tizor	(2009)	at	36.	
7	 Transparency	International	Report	(2016)	at	4.	
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The	ZACC	is	proving	to	be	a	toothless	bulldog.	It	is	a	political	pawn	that	serves	the	
government	of	the	day.	Its	lack	of	independence	is	clear	from	its	inability	to	investigate	the	
University	of	Zimbabwe	Vice-Chancellor,	Levi	Nyagura,	for	abuse	of	public	office.	He	
conferred	upon	Grace	Mugabe	a	fraudulent	PhD	qualification	in	2014.8	Investigations	did	
occur	after	the	ousting	of	Robert	Mugabe	from	power	in	2017.	However,	many	complaints	
were	lodged	by	the	public	before	the	regime	change.	Long	after	the	regime	change,	it	is	
evident	that	the	ZACC	remains	an	ineffective	anti-corruption	agency	(ACA)	as	no	corruption	
convictions	have	occurred	to	date.	Other	problems	faced	by	the	ZACC	include	insufficient	
funding,	lack	of	prosecutorial	powers	and	absence	of	anti-corruption	experts	amongst	its	
staff.	The	epitome	of	its	ineffectiveness	is	the	involvement	of	several	ZACC	commissioners	
themselves	in	corruption	scandals.9	
1.3	 Objectives	of	the	Research	
This	paper	has	three	principal	objectives,	namely:	
1. to	analyse	the	importance	of	an	effective	anti-corruption	commission	as	a	tool	to	
combat	corruption	in	Zimbabwe;	
2. to	outline	and	examine	the	essential	elements	of	an	effective	anti-corruption	
commission;	
3. to	make	recommendations	about	how	the	Zimbabwe	Anti-Corruption	Commission	
may	achieve	its	mandate	of	being	an	effective	anti-corruption	agency.	
1.4	 Research	Questions	
The	study	seeks	to	answer	and	find	solutions	to	the	following	questions:	
1. Do	the	provisions	of	the	Anti-Corruption	Commission	Act	enable	the	ZACC	to	combat	
corruption	effectively	in	Zimbabwe?	
2. What,	if	any,	are	the	legal	and	institutional	reforms	needed	to	improve	the	efficacy	
of	the	ZACC?	
																																								 																				
8	 Chingarande	(2018),	available	at	https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2018/02/18/revealed-grace-got-
fake-phd/	(visited	18	March	2018).	
9	 Mdzungairi	(2018),	available	at	https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/12/2018-national-budget-
highlights/	(visited	18	March	2018).	
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1.5	 The	Development	of	the	ZACC	
Chapter	13	of	the	new	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe,	which	is	the	supreme	law	of	the	land,	
makes	provisions	for	institutions	to	combat	corruption	and	crime.	It	goes	on	to	state	that	a	
Zimbabwe	Anti-Corruption	Commission	needs	to	be	established	to	combat	corruption	in	
Zimbabwe.	The	provision	that	establishes	the	ZACC	can	be	found	also	in	Zimbabwe’s	former	
Constitution.	It	was	under	section	108A	of	that	Constitution	that	the	ZACC	was	established	
in	2004.	However,	the	ZACC	failed	to	bring	about	the	transformation	that	many	hoped	it	
would.	Even	after	its	establishment,	the	number	of	corruption	scandals	continued	to	rise,	
but	no	culprits	were	brought	to	justice.	The	President	granted	the	ZACC	the	power	to	
investigate	politicians.	However,	this	seems	to	have	been	done	merely	for	show	and	to	
generate	the	illusion	of	independence.	The	ZACC	of	2004	did	not	investigate	senior	ZANU-PF	
members	despite	their	implication	in	corruption.	This	was	because	the	2004	ZACC	was	
composed	mainly	of	ZANU-PF	members	or	sympathisers.	The	2004	ZACC	remained	silent	
when	Ministers	were	implicated	in	corruption	scandals,	such	as	the	War	Victims	
Compensation	Fund	scandal,	the	District	Development	Fund	scandal,	the	VIP	Housing	
scandal	and	the	Willowgate	scandal,	as	well	as	the	wealth	accumulation	drive	by	many	
senior	ZANU-PF	officials	since	1980.10	The	2004	ZACC	was	obviously	ineffective.	
After	the	disputed	2008	elections,	the	Zimbabwe	Government	of	National	Unity	
(ZGNU)	was	formed	in	February	2009.	This	led	to	Morgan	Tsvangirai,	the	leader	of	the	
Movement	for	Democratic	Change	(MDC),	being	appointed	Prime	Minister	of	Zimbabwe	
alongside	the	President,	Robert	Mugabe.	The	formation	of	the	ZGNU	led	to	the	renewal	of	
the	ZACC.	The	newly	formed	government	promised	that	tackling	corruption	would	be	a	
priority.	The	revamping	of	the	ZACC	in	2011	left	the	public	eager	to	see	whether	it	would	
fare	any	better	in	tackling	endemic	corruption.	The	public	was	sceptical	of	the	refurbished	
ZACC	because	of	the	poor	record	of	its	predecessor,	which	had	been	inactive	due	to	its	close	
affiliation	with	the	then	ruling	party,	ZANU-PF.	The	renewed	ZACC	failed	to	reduce	
corruption	in	Zimbabwe	significantly.	It	did	not	secure	any	convictions	and	thus	continued	to	
be	perceived	as	an	institution	designed	to	create	an	illusion	of	Zimbabwe’s	anti-corruption	
efforts	for	purposes	of	securing	aid	from	international	donors.	
																																								 																				
10	 Moyo	(2014)	at	220.	
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Fifteen	years	later,	the	ZACC	remains	as	ineffective	and	politically	exposed	as	it	was	
in	2004.	This	is	so	despite	various	promises	from	government	officials	to	overhaul	the	
institution.	In	2017,	Robert	Mugabe	was	ousted	from	the	presidency	and	Emerson	
Mnangagwa	succeeded	him	as	President	of	Zimbabwe.	His	election	campaign	rhetoric	was	
anchored	in	the	need	to	arrest	criminals,	particularly	those	guilty	of	corruption.	In	May	
2018,	he	ostensibly	established	a	Special	Anti-Corruption	Unit	following	a	recommendation	
by	Justice	Minister	Ziyambi	Ziyambi.	According	to	a	statement	released	by	Government,	the	
new	Special	Anti-Corruption	Unit	will	be	housed	in	the	Office	of	the	President	and	Cabinet.	
The	Unit	will	collaborate	with	the	ZACC,	the	Zimbabwe	Republic	Police	(ZRP)	and	other	such	
institutions	in	the	fight	against	corruption.11	It	yet	has	to	be	seen	how	this	Special	Anti-
Corruption	Unit	will	collaborate	with	the	ZACC	and	whether	its	establishment	will	improve	
the	efficacy	of	the	ZACC.	It	can	be	argued	that	the	Special	Anti-Corruption	Unit	was	
established	unconstitutionally.	It	must	be	noted	here	that	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe	
does	not	give	the	President	any	power	to	establish	an	anti-corruption	institution	by	decree.	
The	Special	Anti-Corruption	Unit’s	close	association	with	the	President’s	office	means	that	it	
lacks	independence	and,	like	the	ZACC,	may	accomplish	nothing	in	its	fight	against	
corruption.	
1.6	 Zimbabwe’s	Anti-Corruption	Legal	Framework	
The	drafters	of	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe	put	much	emphasis	on	provisions	aimed	at	
combating	corruption	in	the	country.	They	understood	that	a	successful	fight	against	
corruption	was	crucial	to	promoting	good	governance.	Combating	corruption	is	thus	a	
constitutionally	protected	initiative	in	Zimbabwe.	As	previously	stated,	the	current	ZACC	
was	established	as	a	Chapter	13	institution.	The	Zimbabwean	Constitution	describes	Chapter	
13	institutions	as	“Institutions	to	Combat	Corruption	and	Crime”.	They	include	the	ZACC	and	
the	National	Prosecuting	Authority.	The	Zimbabwe	Anti-Corruption	Commission	Act	was	
promulgated	in	order	to	fulfil	the	requirements	contained	in	the	Zimbabwean	Constitution.	
The	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe	also	provides	for	the	creation	of	the	office	of	the	Auditor-
General	to	audit	all	state	entities.	This	forms	part	of	the	anti-corruption	framework	in	
																																								 																				
11	 Tayana	(2018),	available	at	https://news.pindula.co.zw/2018/05/21/full-text-mnangagwa-sets-up-
special-anti-corruption-unit/	(visited	29	September	2018).	
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Zimbabwe.	The	remainder	of	this	section	discusses	briefly	the	legal	framework	of	the	ZACC,	
the	NPA	and	the	Auditor-General,	as	stipulated	in	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe.	
1.6.1	 The	Zimbabwe	Anti-Corruption	Commission	
The	Constitution	states	that	the	ZACC	should	combat	corruption	through	public	education,	
prevention	and	prosecution	of	offenders	after	a	thorough	investigation.	The	ZACC	has	been	
invested	with	wide-reaching	powers	to	combat	corruption	effectively.	Most	notable	is	its	
power	to	investigate,	which	means	that	it	does	not	have	to	rely	upon	the	police.	What	is	
more,	the	ZACC	has	the	power	to	direct	the	Commissioner-General	of	Police	to	investigate	
cases	of	corruption.	The	Commissioner-General	is	obligated	legally	to	follow	the	instructions	
from	the	ZACC,	with	no	discretion	to	refuse.12	The	ZACC’s	power	to	direct	the	
Commissioner-General	of	Police	was	a	contentious	issue	during	the	constitution-drafting	
process,	as	some	drafters	feared	that	this	would	affect	negatively	the	independence	of	the	
Commissioner-General.	The	provision	was	included	in	the	final	draft	of	the	Constitution	
because	the	drafters	ultimately	agreed	that	the	powers	of	the	ZACC	were	critical.	The	
effective	functioning	of	the	ZACC	required	endowing	it	with	the	power	to	direct	the	police.13	
The	police	are	thus	an	integral	part	of	the	fight	against	corruption	in	Zimbabwe.	However,	it	
is	submitted	that	the	powers	of	the	police	to	deal	with	corruption	cases	are	subordinate	to	
those	of	the	ZACC.	The	police	and	ZACC	are	meant	to	work	together	seamlessly,	but	an	
analysis	of	the	relationship	between	the	two	institutions	may	prove	otherwise.	This	matter	
will	be	discussed	further	in	Chapter	Three.	
1.6.2	 The	National	Prosecuting	Authority	
The	ZACC	does	not	operate	an	independent	corruption	court	and	it	must	rely	on	the	regular	
court	system.	This	makes	the	National	Prosecuting	Authority	(NPA)	pivotal	in	the	
prosecution	of	corruption	cases	in	Zimbabwe.	Hence,	its	inclusion	under	the	Chapter	Twelve	
institutions	of	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe.	Like	the	Commissioner-General	of	Police,	the	
																																								 																				
12	 Aection	255(1)(e)	&	255(2)	of	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe,	2013.	
13	 Magaisa	(2016),	available	at	https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2016/06/24/The-Big-Saturday-Read-
The-last-dance-before-sunset-%E2%80%93-how-Zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-political-elites-are-looting-
the-state	(visited	23	September	2018).	
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NPA	must	prosecute	any	cases	that	are	referred	to	it	by	the	ZACC.14	This	provision	again	
demonstrates	the	high	degree	of	power	that	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe	confers	upon	the	
ZACC.	This	was	done	in	order	to	equip	the	ZACC	with	the	necessary	support	to	ensure	that	it	
effectively	combats	corruption	in	Zimbabwe.	
1.6.3	 The	Office	of	the	Auditor-General	
The	office	of	the	Auditor-General	is	a	constitutional	office	with	a	mandate	to	carry	out	
audits	on	all	state	entities,	including	the	government	itself.	The	Office	is	independent	and,	
through	its	audits,	can	uncover	corrupt	activities	within	state	entities.	Although	the	Office	
does	not	have	a	wide	array	of	powers,	its	work	can	influence	that	of	the	ZACC	positively,	as	
any	audits	revealing	corrupt	activities	can	form	the	basis	of	a	corruption	investigation	
initiated	by	the	ZACC.	
1.7	 Significance	of	the	Study	
The	ZACC	must	play	a	critical	role	in	combating	corruption	in	Zimbabwe.	It	is	imperative	that	
the	institution	performs	its	functions	competently	in	trying	to	win	the	fight	against	
corruption.	Therefore,	there	is	a	pressing	need	to	look	at	the	current	structure	of	the	ZACC,	
its	powers,	duties,	functions	and	the	challenges	it	faces.	Such	an	analysis	can	establish	the	
areas	within	the	Commission	that	require	improvement.	This	would	enable	the	ZACC	to	
achieve	its	mandate	of	combating	corruption,	which	is	vital	for	the	Zimbabwean	economy.	
This	is	crucial,	especially	in	the	post-Mugabe	era,	when	Zimbabwe	has	a	chance	to	initiate	
significant	changes	and	possibly	regain	its	former	status	as	the	breadbasket	of	Africa.	
This	research	is	undertaken	with	the	hope	that	it	will	add	knowledge	to	the	field	of	
law	and	corruption	in	Zimbabwe.	The	problem	of	corruption	in	Zimbabwe	is	not	well	
canvassed	in	literature.	The	ZACC	has	been	neglected	and	has	not	been	the	subject	of	much	
research.	This	paper	seeks	to	contribute	to	fashioning	workable	ways	of	improving	the	
ZACC.	
	 	
																																								 																				
14	 Section	255(1)(f)	of	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe,	2013.	
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1.8	 Chapter	Outlines	
The	remaining	chapters	of	this	research	paper	are	composed	as	follows:	
Chapter	Two	
This	chapter	discusses	the	various	ACA	models	that	a	country	may	adopt	and	the	
international	best	practice	standards	that	promote	and	strengthen	the	effectiveness	of	
ACAs.	The	Jakarta	Statement	on	Principles	for	Anti-Corruption	Agencies,	used	as	the	
foundation	for	international	best	practices,	will	be	reviewed.	
Chapter	Three	
This	chapter	will	analyse	the	ZACC	Act,	the	role	of	the	ZACC	in	Zimbabwe,	its	mandate	and	
its	operational	structure.	It	will	review	the	Commission’s	powers	and	strategies	in	the	fight	
against	corruption.	Furthermore,	it	will	look	at	the	problems	that	the	Commission	faces,	and	
which	inhibit	it	from	operating	as	an	effective	ACA.	
Chapter	Four	
This	is	the	final	chapter	and	will	comprise	a	general	conclusion	to	the	research	paper.	It	will	
make	and	discuss	recommendations	to	improve	the	effectiveness	of	the	ZACC	in	combating	
corruption	in	Zimbabwe.	
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CHAPTER	TWO	
	
INTERNATIONAL	BEST	PRACTICES	FOR	ANTI-CORRUPTION	AGENCIES	
	
	
2.1	 Introduction	
The	worldwide	fight	against	corruption	has	resulted	in	the	formation	of	many	anti-
corruption	agencies	across	the	world.	The	most	common	anti-corruption	strategies	often	
are	led	by	independent	anti-corruption	agencies	explicitly	created	for	that	purpose.1	An	
anti-corruption	agency	(ACA)	may	be	defined	as:	
a	public	body	of	a	durable	nature,	with	a	specific	mission	to	fight	corruption	and	
reduce	the	opportunity	structures	propitious	for	its	occurrence	in	society	through	
preventive	and	repressive	measures.2	
There	is	still	much	debate	about	whether	ACAs	are	useful	tools	to	combat	corruption.	This	is	
due	mainly	to	the	vast	majority	of	the	50	most	corrupt	countries	boasting	at	least	one	
centralised	ACA	tasked	with	the	duty	of	preventing,	investigating	and	prosecuting	
corruption	cases.	By	contrast,	the	ten	least	corrupt	countries	do	not	have	centralised	ACAs.3	
There	is,	therefore,	a	strong	negative	correlation	between	the	presence	of	a	single,	
centralised	ACA	and	the	reduction	of	corruption.	
De	Sousa	argues	that	some	of	the	earliest	agencies	were	born	as	a	response	to	the	
first	wave	of	corruption	scandals	in	the	1980s	and	early	1990s.4	This	has	been	the	case	with	
two	of	the	most	successful	ACAs	in	the	world.	The	Hong	Kong	Independent	Commission	
against	Corruption	(ICAC)	was	formed	in	response	to	the	1974	Peter	Godber	affair,	while	the	
Corrupt	Practices	and	Investigations	Bureau	(CPIB)	in	Singapore	was	strengthened	only	in	
response	to	the	1970s	scandals	involving	police	officers	in	the	narcotics	trade.5	These	crises	
forced	policymakers	to	create	ACAs	independent	of	the	police,	since	the	police	themselves	
were	involved	in	the	scandals.	
																																								 																				
1	 Del	Mar	Landette	(2002)	at	17.	
2	 De	Sousa	(2010)	at	1.	
3	 Kuria	(2012),	available	at	http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/11/13/why-do-anti-corruption-
agencies-fail.html	(visited	1	October	2018).	
4	 De	Sousa	(2010)	at	12.	
5	 Kuria	(2012),	available	at	http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/11/13/why-do-anti-corruption-
agencies-fail.html	(visited	1	October	2018).	
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Singapore	and	Hong	Kong	are	used	routinely	as	the	standard	that	must	be	achieved	
for	an	ACA	to	succeed.	Although	these	have	been	very	successful,	they	cannot	be	
transplanted	directly	to	all	countries.	Some	countries	have	adopted	the	Hong	Kong	and	
Singapore	models	but	with	little	to	no	success.	This	is	because,	when	they	established	their	
agencies,	they	failed	to	take	into	consideration	the	differences	between	their	environment	
and	the	environment	prevalent	in	the	two	locations.6	
Despite	the	seemingly	low	success	rate	of	ACAs,	there	appears	to	be	a	never-ending	
call	for	their	establishment	at	both	the	regional	and	international	levels.	This	is	evident	from	
the	typical	provisions	of	UNCAC,	the	AU	Convention	and	of	various	domestic	and	regional	
laws	and	bodies.7	According	to	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	
Development	(OECD),	the	motive	behind	the	establishment	of	specialised	ACAs	is	the	
expectation	that,	unlike	other	state	institutions,	such	agencies	will	not	be	tainted	by	political	
influence,	can	centralise	information	and	intelligence	about	corruption,	and	can	assert	
leadership	in	the	anti-corruption	agenda.	They	supposedly	help	overcome	the	inefficiency	of	
conventional	law	enforcement	agencies	in	coping	with	the	growing	sophistication	of	corrupt	
mechanisms	and	transactions.8	
This	chapter	discusses	the	various	types	of	ACAs	which	a	country	can	set	up.	It	will	
analyse	also	the	various	debates	on	the	best	anti-corruption	agency	strategy	for	a	country	to	
adopt.	From	the	discussion,	it	will	become	clear	which	strategy	the	ZACC	has	adopted.	A	
consideration	of	the	international	best	practice	standards	on	promoting	and	strengthening	
the	effectiveness	of	ACAs	will	follow.	The	analysis	draws	on	the	practical	experiences	of	
other	countries;	it	also	makes	use	of	the	Jakarta	Statement	on	Principles	for	Anti-Corruption	
Agencies,	which	was	developed	in	2012	by	key	national	ACAs,	international	bodies	and	anti-
corruption	experts.	Additionally,	it	considers	relevant	obligations	under	the	United	Nations	
																																								 																				
6	 Kuria	(2012),	available	at	http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/11/13/why-do-anti-corruption-
agencies-fail.html	(visited	5	January	2019).	
7	 Article	6	of	UNCAC	requires	states	parties	to	guarantee	the	existence	of	an	anti-corruption	agency	or	
agencies	as	a	means	of	implementing	anti-corruption	polices	and	practices	to	prevent	corruption.	
Moreover,	in	Article	36,	UNCAC	obliges	states	parties	to	establish	specialised	bodies	or	persons	to	
combat	corruption.	Similar	calls	are	made	under	Article	20	of	the	AU	Convention,	Article	5(h)	of	the	
ECOWAS	Protocol	and	Article	4(1)(g)	of	the	SADC	Protocol.	
8	 OECD	(2014)	at	3.	
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Convention	against	Corruption	(UNCAC)	and	the	various	United	Nations	guidance	materials	
that	have	been	published	regarding	the	implementation	of	that	Convention.	
2.2	 Types	of	Anti-Corruption	Agencies	
ACAs	may	be	classified	differently;	there	is	no	standard	model	or	approach.	Some	ACAs	are	
created	from	scratch	while	others	have	been	built	on	existing	ombuds	offices	or	special	
units	within	police	or	justice	departments.9	ACAs	may	be	classified	according	to	their	
function	and	the	arm	of	government	to	which	they	report.10	The	ACA	model	which	a	country	
chooses	to	adopt	plays	an	enormous	role	in	the	institution's	ability	to	tackle	corruption	
effectively.	
Firstly,	there	is	the	universal	model	which	encompasses	a	wide	array	of	functions	
that	include	law	enforcement,	investigation	and	prevention.	A	typical	example	of	the	
universal	model	is	Hong	Kong’s	ICAC.11	Secondly,	the	investigative	model	is	characterised	by	
a	small	and	centralised	investigative	commission	which	focuses	on	corruption	crimes,	as	
does	the	Singapore’s	CPIB.12	Both	the	universal	and	investigative	models	are	
organisationally	accountable	to	the	executive.	Thirdly,	the	parliamentary	model,	which	is	
predominantly	concerned	with	preventing	corruption,	includes	commissions	that	report	to	
parliamentary	committees	and	are	independent	of	the	executive	and	judicial	branches	of	
state.13	The	parliamentary	model	is	epitomised	by	the	New	South	Wales	Independent	
Commission	against	Corruption	that	takes	a	preventive	approach	to	fighting	corruption.	
Finally,	the	multi-agency	model	includes	several	offices	that	are	individually	distinct,	but	
together	weave	a	web	of	agencies	to	fight	corruption.14	South	Africa	may	be	used	as	an	
example	of	a	country	that	has	chosen	to	employ	this	model,	with	departments	such	as	the	
																																								 																				
9	 Anti-Corruption	Authorities	(2019),	available	at	http://www.acauthorities.org	(visited	10	January	
2019).	
10	 Anti-Corruption	Authorities	(2019),	available	at	http://www.acauthorities.org	(visited	10	January	
2019).	
11	 Heilbrunn	(2004)	at	4.	
12	 Heilbrunn	(2004)	at	5.	
13	 Heilbrunn	(2004)	at	7.	
14	 OECD	(2014)	at	9.	
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HAWKS,	the	office	of	the	Public	Protector	and	the	National	Director	of	Public	Prosecutions	
all	playing	a	part	in	investigating	and	prosecuting	corruption	cases.15	
2.3	 Choosing	the	Right	ACA	Model	
There	is	no	one-size-fits-all	ACA	model	and	success	is	heavily	dependent	on	choosing	the	
best	model	for	a	country,	considering	various	factors	such	as	the	resources	available	and	the	
political	climate.	Corruption	has	been	identified	as	a	costly	diversion	of	scarce	resources	and	
an	impediment	to	development	effectiveness.16	The	labelling	of	corruption	as	the	basis	for	
underdevelopment	all	over	the	world	has	led	to	the	adoption	of	various	anti-corruption	
strategies.	Emulation	and	learning	from	success	stories	is	a	standard	operating	procedure	of	
administrative	reformers	worldwide.17	In	the	case	of	borrowing	and	transplantation	of	ACA	
success	stories,	several	of	the	most	commonly	recommended	templates	originate	from	
Hong	Kong	and	Singapore.	These	cases	frequently	are	taken	as	object	lessons	in	how	a	
developing	country	successfully	combats	serious	corruption.	However,	as	noted	earlier,	the	
adoption	of	ACA	templates	from	Hong	Kong	and	Singapore	fails	to	consider	the	cultural,	
social,	historical,	legal	and	political	background	of	most	developing	countries.	Failure	to	take	
these	important	factors	into	account	increases	the	likelihood	of	failure	for	an	ACA.	
Therefore,	it	is	important	that	countries	make	a	realistic	assessment	of	their	organisational	
maturity,	capacity	and	environmental	constraints	before	establishing	an	ACA,	with	a	view	to	
ensuring	that	the	ACA	fits	functionally	within	the	local	context.18	
According	to	Doig	&	Riley,	ACAs	that	are	modelled	after	Hong	Kong’s	ICAC	carry	a	
high	level	of	expectation.19	However,	the	ACAs	in	developing	countries,	such	as	Zimbabwe,	
usually	are	malfunctioning	and	poorly	designed	institutions	in	hostile	political	and	economic	
environments.	To	aggravate	the	situation,	the	agencies	often	are	given	an	ambiguous	and	
far-reaching	mandate,	which	covers	investigation,	prosecution,	prevention	and	education.	
This	mandate	becomes	impossible	to	accomplish	as	the	ACAs	often	lack	the	capacity	and	
																																								 																				
15	 Majila	et	al	(2017)	at	89.	
16	 Heilbrunn	(2004)	at	5.	
17	 Dong	et al	(2008)	at	93.	
18	 OECD	(2008)	at	24.	
19	 Doig	&	Riley	(1998)	at	53.	
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resources	to	perform	any	one	of	those	functions	well.	They	become	overburdened	and	
ultimately	fail.20	
Countries	must	be	selective	as	to	the	kind	of	power	an	ACA	is	given.	Anti-corruption	
advocates	worldwide	deride	‘‘toothless’’	ACAs	and	demand	agencies	‘‘with	teeth’’,	meaning	
strong	law	enforcement	powers.	However,	there	are	drawbacks	to	such	powers.	Kuris	
argues	that	despite	the	popularisation	of	ACAs	with	strong	investigative	powers	─	such	as	
the	ability	to	execute	search	warrants,	use	force	and	arrest	suspects	─	there	might	be	a	need	
for	some	countries	to	adopt	what	he	terms	the	“toothless”	approach,	as	this	would	create	
an	ACA	that	is	more	resilient,	robust	and	cost-effective.21	A	“toothless”	ACA	could	be	
described	as	one	that	may	focus	on	preventive	measures	and	exposing	corruption	when	it	
happens.	Although	such	an	ACA	may	not	be	able	to	effect	arrests,	the	tasks	of	prevention,	
education	and	bringing	corruption	to	light	are	essential.	It	may	be	an	effective	strategy	for	
ACAs	in	developing	countries,	as	these	countries	often	do	not	have	the	resources	to	sustain	
a	universal	model	type	of	ACA.	
On	the	one	hand,	the	popular	universal	model	ACAs	require	substantial	resources	
and	attention.	They	tackle	problems	using	law	enforcement,	with	intent	to	trigger	reform	by	
‘‘cleaning	house’’	or	deterring	wrongdoing,	and	thus	are	not	well	suited	necessarily	to	
continued	patterns	of	unethical	behaviour	or	systemic	corruption	risks	that	are	present	in	
most	developing	countries.	They	require	a	well-functioning	and	independent	legal	system	
that	can	tackle	high-level	corruption	cases.22	On	the	other	hand,	“toothless”	ACAs	are	more	
manageable,	versatile,	viable	and	adaptable	to	a	range	of	conditions.	However,	they	require	
partners	inside	and	outside	of	government	to	act	upon	their	findings.	Without	police	
powers,	they	face	difficulties	attracting	public	support.	To	achieve	results,	a	watchdog	ACA	
must	allocate	resources	to	research	and	communications,	build	strong	partnerships,	and	
respond	strategically	to	specific	corruption	problems.23	
In	a	nutshell,	the	adoption	of	a	centralised	ACA,	such	as	ICAC	and	the	CIPB,	in	
developing	countries	normally	fails	to	achieve	its	goals	of	combating	corrupt.	The	reasons	
																																								 																				
20	 Kuris	(2015)	at	127.	
21	 Kuris	(2015)	at	127.	
22	 Kuris	(2015)	at	132.	
23	 Kuris	(2015)	at	132.	
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for	this	failure	include	the	fact	that	most	countries	establish	an	ACA	under	pressure	from	
donors.	Often	the	establishment	of	an	ACA	is	not	the	result	of	a	home-grown	decision,	thus	
its	establishment	lacks	the	political	backing	to	ensure	that	it	is	able	to	carry	out	its	mandate,	
even	when	politically	exposed	individuals	need	to	be	investigated.24	The	lack	of	political	will	
also	constrains	the	resources	allocated	to	the	ACA.	This	invariably	leads	to	the	ACA	being	
unable	to	carry	out	its	functions,	as	it	does	not	have	the	resources	for	its	day-to-day	
operations	which	would	be	extensive	as	a	centralised	ACA	has	multiple	functions.	
Furthermore,	by	virtue	of	being	centralised,	the	ACA	becomes	vulnerable	to	political	attacks.	
It	has	no	other	kindred	institutions	that	can	back	up	its	work,	making	its	downfall	easier	
when	under	attack	from	politicians.25	
Zimbabwe,	like	many	countries	in	the	world,	has	used	the	universal	model	as	a	
blueprint	for	developing	its	anti-corruption	agency.	The	ZACC	is	modelled	after	Hong	Kong’s	
ICAC.	Although	this	model	has	been	very	successful	in	Hong	Kong,	the	same	cannot	be	said	
for	Zimbabwe.	Adopting	the	universal	model	in	a	country	with	high	levels	of	grand	
corruption	and	lack	of	political	will	puts	the	model	at	risk	of	likely	failure,	as	is	the	case	in	
Zimbabwe.	To	ensure	success,	Zimbabwe	may	need	to	adopt	an	ACA	that	is	suited	properly	
to	the	economic,	cultural	and	political	climate	of	the	country.	This	possibility	is	discussed	
further	in	Chapter	Three	below.	
2.4	 Features	of	Successful	Anti-Corruption	Agencies	
The	success	of	an	ACA	is	dependent	largely	on	the	fulfilment	of	certain	basic	requirements.	
Based	on	his	extensive	survey	of	top	ACA	officials	from	different	countries,	De	Sousa	has	
identified	several	basic	criteria	that	ACAs	need	to	meet	to	be	effective.26	Some	of	the	most	
important	requirements	are	discussed	in	detail	below.	Only	by	meeting	these	standards	may	
the	ACAs	have	a	chance	of	becoming	effective	institutions.27	Unfortunately,	the	conclusion	
																																								 																				
24	 Kuria	(2012),	available	at	http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/11/13/why-do-anti-corruption-
agencies-fail.html	(visited	5	January	2019).	
25	 Kuria	(2012),	available	at	http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/11/13/why-do-anti-corruption-
agencies-fail.html	(visited	5	January	2019).	
26	 De	Sousa	(2009)		
27	 Makowski	(2016)	at	67.	
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from	De	Sousa’s	analysis	and	other	reports	is	that	around	the	world	there	are	but	few	
agencies	which	fully	follow	these	principles.28	
2.4.1	 Legal	Framework	
The	legal	framework	which	governs	the	establishment	and	maintenance	of	the	ACA,	as	well	
as	the	regulation	of	its	functions,	must	be	stable	and	formulated	well.	It	is	an	essential	
component	in	the	success	or	failure	of	an	ACA.	The	law	in	terms	of	which	an	ACA	is	
established	should	define:	the	scope	of	its	duties	and	powers;	its	relations	with	other	
institutions	and	rules	of	procedure	regarding	accountability;	clear	rules	for	appointing	and	
dismissing	its	chief;	and	the	rules	for	approving	its	budget.29	The	legal	framework	is	the	
foundation	of	an	ACA.	To	ensure	that	an	ACA	functions	at	its	optimum,	it	is	imperative	that	
the	law	governing	its	operations	incorporate	provisions	that	are	in	line	with	international	
best	practices.	This	means	that	the	legal	provisions	regulating	the	ACA,	amongst	other	
things,	should	guarantee	funding	for	the	ACA,	regulate	the	appointment	and	dismissal	of	
staff,	protect	and	promote	its	independence	and	ensure	that	clear	accountability	
mechanisms	exist	within	the	institution.30	It	is	submitted	that	when	drafting	laws	that	
govern	an	ACA,	it	is	important	that	drafters	use	UNCAC	and	documents	such	as	the	Jakarta	
Statement	on	Principles	for	Anti-Corruption	Agencies	as	guidelines.	This	will	help	to	ensure	
that	the	ACA	is	based	on	laws	that	are	designed	by	experts	at	combating	corruption	
effectively.	
2.4.2	 Independence	
The	independence	of	an	ACA	is	crucial	to	its	effectiveness.	International	standards	require	
that	independence	and	autonomy	be	ensured	for	the	anti-corruption	authorities,	with	the	
aim	of	helping	them	to	carry	out	their	functions	effectively	and	free	from	undue	pressure.	
Independence	ensures	that	the	ACA	can	investigate	all	cases	of	corruption	without	fear	or	
favour.	An	ACA	that	is	viewed	as	independent	achieves	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	the	public.	
UNCAC	states	that	an	ACA	may	be	considered	independent	when	it	has	all	the	necessary	
material	resources,	is	free	from	undue	influence,	has	specialised	staff,	and	has	the	capacity	
																																								 																				
28	 Makowski	(2016)	at	67.	
29	 UNDP	(2011)	at	16.	
30	 UNODC	(2009)	at	11.	
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to	provide	the	training	to	enable	the	staff	members	to	carry	out	their	functions.31	The	
independence	of	an	ACA	is	multifaceted.	The	work	of	the	ACA	should	not	be	subject	to	
interference.	An	example	of	how	a	country	has	ensured	independence	may	be	found	in	
Romania.	The	Direcția	Națională	Anticorupție	secures	independence	through	legal	
dispositions	which	allow	the	prosecutor	to	notify	the	Superior	Council	of	Magistracy	
regarding	any	attempt	at	interference	with	an	investigation.	This	occurs	even	where	
interference	comes	from	the	upper	hierarchy	as	the	re-allocation	of	cases	is	prohibited	
except	in	exceptional	circumstances.32	
2.4.3	 Accountability	
Measures	must	be	put	in	place	to	encourage	accountability	of	an	ACA.	This	increases	the	
legitimacy	of	the	ACA	in	the	eyes	of	the	public	as	accountability	is	accompanied	by	
openness.	An	effective	accountability	mechanism	leads	to	credibility	and	stronger	public	
support.33	The	more	powers	the	ACA	has,	the	more	accountability	measures	should	
accompany	its	operations.	It	is	essential	to	introduce	adequate	checks	and	balances	and	
provide	for	scrutiny	by	various	oversight	mechanisms	to	make	sure	that	ACAs	are	not	able	to	
abuse	their	autonomy	and	that	they	operate	in	an	unbiased	manner.34	
Accountability	is	usually	two-fold	in	relation	to	an	ACA.	Firstly,	the	ACA	is	
accountable	to	the	public.	This	means	that	the	work	of	the	ACA	should	be	available	readily	
to	the	public	and	should	engage	with	the	media	where	possible.	Secondly,	the	ACA	must	be	
accountable	to	the	branch	of	government	to	which	it	reports.	This	may	be	the	legislature	or	
the	executive,	depending	on	the	ACA	model	selected.	Accountability	can	be	achieved	
through	preparing	and	presenting	reports	that	document	the	ACA’s	work.	The	reports	can	
be	made	available	to	the	public	subsequently.	For	example,	Poland’s	Central	Anti-Corruption	
Bureau	(CBA)	has	a	special	obligation	to	provide	Parliament	with	information	about	the	
results	of	its	activities,	as	well	as	to	submit	the	report	to	the	Prime	Minister	and	the	
Parliamentary	Special	Services	Committee	before	31	March	each	year.	According	to	the	
Polish	law	on	criminal	procedure	and	the	CBA	Bill,	the	courts	and	the	prosecutor’s	office	are	
																																								 																				
31	 Article	6(2)	of	UNCAC.	
32	 EPAC	(2008)	at	8.	
33	 UNDP	(2011)	at	32.		
34	 Chene	(2012)	at	4.	
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responsible	for	the	supervision	of	investigations,	including	supervision	of	special	operations	
such	as	controlled	bribery	and	operational	control.35	
2.4.4	 Clear	Mandate	
A	successful	ACA	needs	clear	direction	as	to	the	type	of	work	it	will	do	to	combat	corruption.	
This	is	only	possible	where	the	ACA	has	a	determinate	legal	mission	or	mandate,	with	
sharply	delineated	roles	and	functions.	The	need	for	a	clear	mandate	is	a	precept	recognised	
in	the	Jakarta	Principles,	which	state	that:	
ACAs	shall	have	clear	mandates	to	tackle	corruption	through	prevention,	
education,	awareness	raising,	investigation	and	prosecution,	either	through	one	
agency	or	multiple	co-ordinated	agencies.36	
2.4.5	 Integrity	and	Impartiality	
In	public	administration,	integrity	refers	to	honesty	and	trustworthiness	in	the	discharge	of	
official	duties,	and	serves	as	an	antithesis	to	corruption	or	the	abuse	of	office	for	private	
gain.37	ACAs	should	adopt	codes	of	conduct	requiring	the	highest	standards	of	ethical	
conduct	from	their	staff	and	a	strong	compliance	regime.38	The	employees	of	an	ACA	must	
conduct	themselves	with	the	highest	levels	of	integrity	so	as	to	preserve	the	legitimacy	of	
the	institution.	It	is	also	important	that	the	ACA	conduct	its	work	impartially.	No	one	should	
be	above	the	law.	This	means	that	matters	before	the	ACA	must	be	dealt	with	objectively,	
according	to	the	merits	and	circumstances	of	each	case.39	
2.4.6	 Resources	
Adequate	funding	is	essential	to	allowing	an	ACA	to	fulfil	its	mandate.	An	ACA	needs	both	
financial	resources	and	human	resources	to	ensure	that	it	can	carry	out	its	work	effectively.	
Countries	that	have	ACAs	must	allocate	enough	funds	to	ensure	that	they	are	equipped	with	
well-trained	staff	and	the	financial	resources	to	carry	out	in-depth	investigations	into	
																																								 																				
35	 EPAC	(2011)	at	9.	
36	 Jakarta	Statement	on	Principles	for	Anti-Corruption	Agencies	(2012).	
37	 EPAC	(2011)	at	5.	
38	 Jakarta	Statement	on	Principles	for	Anti-Corruption	Agencies	(2012).	
39	 EPAC	(2011)	at	5.	
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corruption.	An	ACA	which	lacks	adequate	resources	cannot	function	at	its	optimum.	It	
inevitably	performs	dismally.	This	lowers	the	level	of	public	confidence	in	the	institution.40	
2.4.7	 Recruitment	and	Appointment	of	Staff	
The	recruitment	of	staff	must	be	based	on	the	principles	of	efficiency,	transparency	and	
fairness,	and	upon	known	and	objective	criteria	such	as	merit,	equity	and	aptitude.	The	
process	of	appointment	must	be	transparent.	The	appointing	mechanism	utilised	must	
ensure	consensus	support	for	an	appointee	through	Parliament,	rather	than	the	executive.	
An	accountability	mechanism	must	exist	outside	the	executive,	perhaps	in	the	form	of	a	
parliamentary	selection	committee	on	which	all	major	parties	are	represented.	This	would	
limit	the	space	for	corruption	in	the	recruitment	of	ACA	staff.41	The	dismissal	process	also	
should	be	transparent	and	based	on	sound	reasoning	rather	than	political	motivation.	The	
removal	of	top	ACA	officials	should	occur	through	established	legal	procedures.42	
The	security	of	employees	allows	them	to	work	with	rigour	within	the	ACA	and	thus	
to	pursue	the	fight	against	corruption	more	efficiently.	The	ACA	can	only	be	as	efficient	as	
its	employees.	Therefore,	it	is	imperative	that	the	staff	undergo	training	regularly	to	remain	
effective	in	combating	corruption	by	undertaking	their	duties	diligently.43	
2.4.8	 Co-operation	
In	order	to	fight	corruption	effectively,	ACAs	cannot	work	in	isolation.	They	must	pool	
resources	with	other	interested	parties.	UNCAC	recognises	the	importance	of	co-operation	
and	advocates	it	between	various	bodies	to	ensure	that	states	parties	can	fight	corruption	
successfully.44	ACAs	should	have	a	good	working	relationship	with	the	media	and	civil	
society,	as	well	as	with	other	state	agencies	such	as	the	police	and	the	judiciary.45	Also,	they	
must	maintain	good	relations	with	other	states,	as	often	corruption	is	a	transnational	crime	
in	respect	of	which	a	state	requires	mutual	legal	assistance.	This	will	enable	the	ACAs	to	
acquire	valuable	information,	access	operational	support	and	joint	investigative	activities,	
																																								 																				
40	 OECD	(2008)	at	27.	
41	 Majila	et	al	(2017)	at	91.	
42	 Jakarta	Statement	on	Principles	for	Anti-Corruption	Agencies	(2012).	
43	 USAID	(2006)	at	12.	
44	 Article	13	of	UNCAC.	
45	 Jakarta	Statement	on	Principles	for	Anti-Corruption	Agencies	(2012).	
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and	gather	intelligence	and	evidence	related	to	corruption	offences	including,	where	
appropriate,	the	identification	and	recovery	of	the	proceeds	of	corruption.46	
2.4.9	 Political	Will	
An	ACA	will	not	be	effective	where	there	is	a	lack	of	genuine	political	will	to	fight	
corruption.47	Where	an	ACA	is	established	simply	to	support	the	anti-corruption	agenda	and	
to	appease	the	donor	community,	international	monitoring	bodies,	foreign	investors	or	the	
domestic	public,	its	proper	functioning	is	at	risk.48	Researchers	analysing	ACAs	stress	that	
their	effectiveness	is	dependent	largely	on	the	motivations	underlying	the	decisions	to	
create	them.49	Lack	of	real	political	will	to	fight	corruption	and	the	simple	desire	to	please	
the	international	community	in	this	matter	cannot	be	a	solid	basis	for	creating	an	effective	
ACA.50	An	ACA	that	has	the	support	of	the	government	likely	is	to	be	furnished	with	all	the	
necessary	resources	to	carry	out	its	mandate	without	fear	or	favour.	
2.5	 The	Jakarta	Statement	on	Principles	for	Anti-Corruption	Agencies	
The	Jakarta	Statement	on	Principles	for	Anti-Corruption	Agencies	is	a	non-binding	resolution	
promulgated	by	representatives	of	ACAs	from	around	the	world.	It	contains	sixteen	
recommendations	which	aim	to	ensure	the	independence	and	effectiveness	of	ACAs.	The	
Jakarta	Statement	was	endorsed	by	the	International	Association	of	Anti-Corruption	
Authorities	at	its	2014	Panama	meeting	and	noted	(though	not	explicitly	endorsed)	also	by	
the	Conference	of	the	States	Parties	to	UNCAC	in	its	most	recent	resolution	on	the	
prevention	of	corruption.51	This	research	paper	relies	heavily	on	the	Jakarta	Statement	in	
discussing	the	international	best	practices	that	ACAs	ought	to	adopt.	However,	it	must	be	
noted	that	the	Jakarta	Statement	is	not	without	its	flaws.	
Although	the	Jakarta	principles	may	be	used	as	a	guide	that	ACAs	can	follow	to	
ensure	success,	it	is	not	a	very	detailed	document.	It	does	not	lay	down	any	measures	or	
policies	that	an	ACA	should	adopt.	It	is	referred	to	often	in	the	discussion	of	international	
																																								 																				
46	 EPAC	(2011)	at	8.	
47	 UNDP	(2011)	at	27.	
48	 OECD	(2008)	at	10.	
49	 OECD	(2007)	at	4.	
50	 Makowski	(2016)	at	67.	
51	 Seventh	COSP	UNCAC	Resolution	7/5	(2017).	
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
	 20	
best	practices,	but	it	remains	a	political	rather	than	an	analytical	document.	Its	non-binding	
nature	also	significantly	weakens	the	impact	of	its	recommendations,	as	there	is	no	fear	of	
repercussions	for	countries	which	fail	to	embrace	the	principles.	Be	that	as	it	may,	the	
Jakarta	principles	express	the	world's	agreement	on	the	need	for	independent	ACAs.	
Independence	is	at	the	core	of	a	successful	ACA,	and	the	Jakarta	Statement	recognises	its	
importance	and	advocates	strongly	that	the	independence	of	ACAs	around	the	world	be	
guaranteed.	However,	without	any	mechanisms	to	check	that	countries	do	adopt	the	
principles	in	the	Jakarta	Statement,	it	remains	just	that	—	a	statement	that	is	great	on	paper	
but	of	little	or	no	practical	use.	
2.6	 Conclusion	
The	international	best	practices	discussed	in	this	chapter	are	not	exhaustive.	They	are	based	
on	some	of	the	practices	that	effective	ACAs	have	used	and	on	the	Jakarta	Statement	on	
Principles	for	Anti-Corruption	Agencies.	Currently,	there	is	no	binding	instrument	that	ACAs	
may	rely	upon	as	a	blueprint	for	the	best	practices	standard.	UNCAC	contains	provisions	
that	may	be	interpreted	as	constituting	some	guidance	on	best	practices	for	the	fight	
against	corruption,	but	they	do	not	apply	specifically	to	ACAs.52	However,	the	
implementation	of	all	the	best	practices	identified	above	will	increase	significantly	the	
efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	ACAs.	
The	next	chapter	introduces	and	discusses	the	structure	of	the	ZACC	and	the	extent	
to	which	it	adheres	to	the	standards	discussed	in	this	chapter.	 	
																																								 																				
52	 Article	1	of	UNCAC	lists	the	objectives	of	the	Convention,	which	are	to	prevent	and	combat	corruption	
by	promoting	and	strengthening	international	co-operation,	integrity,	accountability	and	good	
management	of	public	property.	These	objectives	do	not	relate	specifically	to	ACAs,	but	they	have	
been	adopted	in	the	Jakarta	Statement	which	does	relate	to	ACAs.	
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CHAPTER	THREE	
	
THE	ZIMBABWE	ANTI-CORRUPTION	COMMISSION	
	
	
3.1	 Introduction	
The	Zimbabwe	Anti-Corruption	Commission	(ZACC)	is	pivotal	to	Zimbabwe’s	fight	against	
corruption.	Reviews	show	that	most	ACAs	are	ineffective	and	have	failed	to	live	up	to	
expectations.1	One	of	the	most	common	reasons	why	ACAs	have	failed	is	that	governments	
have	not	undertaken	a	thorough	policy	planning	process	regarding	the	need	for	an	
appropriate	ACA	model.2	An	effective	ACA	must	adhere	to	international	best	practice	
standards.	When	determining	the	effectiveness	of	the	ZACC	in	combating	corruption,	it	is	
imperative	to	analyse	its	strengths	and	weaknesses.	
This	chapter	will	examine	the	Anti-Corruption	Commission	Act	(ZACC	Act),	which	is	
the	enabling	legislation	of	the	ZACC,	to	establish	whether	it	complies	with	the	international	
best	practice.	Furthermore,	it	will	assess	the	ZACC	as	an	institution.	Its	different	features,	
including	the	appointment	of	its	Commissioners	and	members	of	staff,	its	powers	and	
duties,	its	independence,	its	accountability	and	its	funding	will	be	discussed.	The	chapter	will	
conclude	by	considering	the	achievements	and	failures	of	the	ZACC	in	its	fight	against	
corruption	in	Zimbabwe.	
3.2	 The	Anti-Corruption	Commission	Act	
An	analysis	of	the	ZACC	Act	is	crucial	in	understanding	how	the	ZACC	as	an	institution	
operates.	The	Act	contains	19	sections,	which	encompass	the	mandate	of	the	commission,	
its	operations,	staff	employment	and	resources.	Although	the	ZACC	Act	details	how	the	
ZACC	operates,	it	is	important	to	understand	that	the	ZACC	is	a	constitutional	body.	It	
derives	its	existence	from	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe	and	thus	enjoys	the	highest	level	of	
legal	protection.	The	provisions	of	the	ZACC	Act	are	mirrored	in	the	2013	Constitution	of	
Zimbabwe.	However,	there	are	slight	differences,	so	in	discussing	the	ZACC	Act	one	must	
consider	also	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe.	
																																								 																				
1	 De	Jaegere	(2012)	at	90.	
2	 Heeks	(2011)	at	2.	
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3.2.1	 Appointment	and	Employment	Conditions	of	ZACC	Staff	
The	appointment,	dismissal	and	expected	conduct	of	ZACC	staff	are	regulated	by	the	ZACC	
Act.	The	ZACC	consists	of	two	sets	of	staff	members.	Firstly,	there	are	the	Commissioners	
who	collectively	make	up	the	“Commission”	and	are	clothed	with	statutory	powers	provided	
in	the	Constitution.3	Secondly,	there	are	the	staff	members	employed	by	the	Commission	to	
act	as	administrative	delegates	and	secretariat.4	The	statutory	sections	predominantly	deal	
with	the	Commissioners	rather	than	the	general	staff,	largely	because	they	undertake	the	
ZACC’s	more	substantive	work.	Seven	of	the	nineteen	sections	in	the	ZACC	Act	relate	to	
staffing.	This	means	that	the	drafters	of	the	Act	presumed	that	the	ZACC	staffers	were	an	
essential	component	of	the	success	of	the	ZACC	as	an	institution.	
Close	analysis	of	the	ZACC	Act	provisions	that	deal	with	the	appointment	of	the	ZACC	
Chairperson	and	Deputy	Chairperson	reveal	that	the	President	of	Zimbabwe	has	significant	
unregulated	powers	in	choosing	the	individuals	who	run	the	ZACC.	This	was	a	huge	oversight	
on	the	part	of	the	drafters	of	the	Act.	The	ZACC	Act	has	given	the	President	the	power	to	
appoint	the	Chairperson	and	Deputy	Chairperson	of	the	ZACC.5	The	President	also	has	the	
power	to	direct	that	the	Deputy	Chairperson	not	assume	the	post	of	Chairperson	if	the	
latter	post	is	vacant.6	The	ZACC	Act	gives	the	President	complete	discretion	as	to	who	heads	
the	ZACC.	It	does	not	require	him	to	obtain	the	opinions	of	others	nor	does	it	require	him	to	
furnish	reasons	for	his	choices.	
The	ZACC	Act	provides	no	checks	and	balances	upon	the	President’s	powers	of	
appointment.	This	may	lead	to	his	appointing	ZACC	Chairpersons	who	are	sympathisers	of	
the	ruling	party,	as	happened	in	2004.7	Even	if	the	appointees	have	no	political	affiliation,	
they	may	feel	obligated	to	be	loyal	to	the	President.	It	is	evident	that	the	ZACC	Act	does	not	
contain	provisions	that	ensure	that	the	ZACC	Commissioners	appointment	procedure	is	
independent.	It	does	not	comply	with	the	international	best	practice	standards	for	ACA’s.	
However,	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe	requires	that	the	appointments	of	the	Chairperson	
and	Deputy	Chairperson	be	made	in	consultation	with	the	Committee	on	Standing	Rules	and	
																																								 																				
3	 OSISA	(2017)	at	353.	
4	 OSISA	(2017)	at	353.	
5	 Section	4(1)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
6	 Section	4(2)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
7	 Moyo	(2014)	at	237.	
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Orders.8	The	Constitution	is	the	superior	law	of	Zimbabwe,	thus	the	provision	requiring	that	
consultation	take	place	before	the	appointment	of	Commissioners	must	be	observed.	The	
drafters	of	the	Constitution	understood	that	in	order	to	maintain	the	independence	of	the	
ZACC,	there	is	a	to	restrict	the	President’s	powers	to	appoint	Commissioners.	This	is	helpful	
as	it	ensures	that	the	President	of	Zimbabwe	does	not	have	unfettered	powers	to	appoint	as	
the	heads	of	the	ZACC.	The	appointment	procedures	in	the	ZACC	Act	are	not	in	line	with	the	
Constitution,	and	ought	to	be	redrafted	to	align	with	the	spirit	of	the	Zimbabwean	
Constitution,	which	aims	to	promote	democracy	and	rule	of	law.		
The	ZACC	Act	provides	no	guidance	on	how	the	eight	Commissioners	are	to	be	
appointed.	However,	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe	stipulates	the	procedure	that	must	be	
followed	in	the	appointment	of	members	of	independent	commissions,	such	as	the	ZACC.	In	
order	to	identify	eligible	persons,	for	transparency’s	sake,	the	Committee	on	Standing	Rules	
and	Orders	must	advertise	the	positions,	invite	the	public	to	make	nominations,	conduct	
public	interviews	of	prospective	candidates,	prepare	a	list	of	nominees,	and	submit	the	list	
to	the	President.9	The	elaborate	appointments	procedure	minimises	the	influence	that	the	
President	has	in	selecting	the	Commissioners.	It	also	gives	the	ZACC	an	aura	of	
independence.	The	public	involvement	is	crucial	as	it	makes	the	ZACC	seem	legitimate	in	the	
eyes	of	the	people.	This	is	in	line	with	international	best	practice	standards.	That	said,	the	
President	still	has	the	final	say,	thus	the	supposed	independence	of	the	ZACC	is	diluted.	
In	January	2019,	the	ZACC	Chairperson,	Deputy	Chairperson	and	all	eight	
Commissioners	resigned.10	They	did	so	after	President	Mnangagwa	stated	that	he	would	
restructure	the	ZACC.11	It	is	unclear	what	prompted	the	mass	resignations.	It	could	have	
been	the	presidential	threat	of	restructuring	the	ZACC.	When	all	Commissioners	resign,	the	
ZACC	is	left	at	a	standstill	as	the	Commissioners	play	an	integral	role	in	the	ZACC’s	
functioning.	The	ZACC	Act	does	not	envision	a	situation	where	all	Commissioners	resign,	
thus	there	is	no	provision	in	the	Act	to	deal	with	the	situation.	The	ZACC	Act	does	envisage	
																																								 																				
8	 Section	254(1)	of	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe,	2013.	
9	 Section	237(1)	of	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe,	2013.	
10	 Mashaya	(2019),	available	at	https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2019/02/01/zacc-chair-
Commissioners-resign	(visited	5	February	2019).	
11	 Mashaya	(2019).	
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that	Commissioners	serve	out	a	one-month	notice	period.12	A	notice	period	permits	new	
Commissioners	to	be	appointed	prior	to	the	current	Commissioners	leaving.	The	ZACC	
would	remain	functional	if	this	approach	were	adopted.	However,	the	President	accepted	
the	resignation	of	all	the	Commissioners,	despite	the	lack	of	a	notice	period.13	This	leaves	
the	ZACC	with	no	Commissioners	until	the	President	appoints	new	individuals	to	the	vacant	
posts.	It	means	that,	until	new	Commissioners	are	appointed,	the	ZACC	remains	at	a	
standstill.	
In	March	2019,	the	President	appointed	Justice	Loice	Matanda-Moyo	as	the	ZACC	
Chairperson.14	The	development	was	announced	as	the	Committee	on	Standing	Rules	and	
Orders	was	in	the	middle	of	selecting	eight	new	members	of	the	commission	from	a	large	
pool	of	130	applicants.15	Mnangagwa’s	decision	to	appoint	Justice	Matanda-Moyo	has	been	
met	with	some	criticism	as	she	is	not	viewed	as	an	independent	candidate.	This	is	because	
she	is	married	to	the	Foreign	Affairs	and	International	Trade	Minister,	Sibusiso	Busi	Moyo.16	
Although	it	could	be	argued	that	the	Chairperson’s	marital	status	should	not	play	a	role	in	
their	appointment,	the	conflict	of	interest	present	in	the	appointment	of	Justice	Matanda-
Moyo	cannot	be	ignored.	Her	appointment	will	not	instil	public	confidence	in	the	ZACC,	
rather	it	will	appear	biased	in	favour	of	the	ruling	party.	
The	ZACC	Act	offers	security	of	tenure	for	the	Commissioners.	They	may	not	serve	
more	than	two	terms	in	the	ZACC.17	However,	during	their	tenure,	they	may	not	have	their	
salaries	reduced.18	This	ensures	that	they	may	perform	their	duties	without	the	fear	of	
salary	reductions	if	they	investigate	top-ranking	officials.	They	can	decide	on	the	merits	of	a	
case	rather	than	being	influenced	by	threats	to	their	salaries.	The	ZACC	Act	gives	the	
President	the	power	to	suspend	Commissioners.19	It	can	be	argued	that	this	power	should	
																																								 																				
12	 Section	10(2)(e)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
13	 Mashaya	(2019).	
14	 Mpofu	(2019),	available	at	https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/43219-latest-president-emmerson-
mnangagwa-appoints-new-zacc-chairperson.html	(visited	23	April	2019).	
15	 Munyoro	(2019),	available	at	https://allafrica.com/stories/201903210491.html	(visited	24	April	2019).	
16	 Kanambura	(2019),	available	at	https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2019/03/29/uproar-over-
mnangagwas-pick-for-new-zacc-chair/	(visited	23	April	2019).	
17	 Section	6(1)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
18	 Section	7(4)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
19	 Section	3	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
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not	have	been	given	to	the	President,	as	it	makes	the	Commissioners	vulnerable	to	the	
President,	thereby	undermining	the	independence	of	the	ZACC.	
The	ZACC	Act	stipulates	the	qualifications	that	an	individual	must	possess	in	order	to	
be	appointed	as	the	Chairperson	or	Deputy	Chairperson	of	the	ZACC.	These	are	ten	years’	
experience	in	investigating	crime,	seven	years’	post-qualification	experience	or	eligibility	to	
be	a	judge	of	the	High	Court.20	The	President	can	circumvent	the	stipulated	qualifications	if	
he	believes	the	appointee	has	the	ability	and	experience	to	head	the	ZACC.21	Although	the	
ZACC	Act	does	not	stipulate	the	qualifications	that	a	Commissioner	must	possess,	the	
Constitution	is	broader	than	the	Act	and	stipulates	that	the	abovementioned	qualifications	
be	applicable	not	only	to	the	Chairperson	and	Deputy	Chairperson,	but	to	all	ZACC	
Commissioners.22	The	stipulated	qualifications	ensure	that	well-qualified	individuals	are	
appointed	as	Commissioners.	This	results	in	a	better	functioning	ZACC	and	boosts	the	
Commission’s	ability	to	achieve	its	mandate.	The	President’s	power	to	appoint	a	
Commissioner	who	does	not	have	the	requisite	qualifications	is	not	in	line	with	international	
best	practice.	It	may	result	in	under-qualified	individuals	being	appointed	as	Commissioners	
and,	ultimately,	failing	to	achieve	the	ZACC’s	mandate.	We	may	consider	the	unfettered	
power	that	the	ZACC	Act	gives	to	the	President	its	worst	feature.	
3.2.2	 Disqualification	and	Removal	of	ZACC	Staff	
The	ZACC	Act	stipulates	factors	that	disqualify	an	individual	from	being	appointed	as	a	
Commissioner	of	the	ZACC.23	Once	an	individual	is	disqualified	by	the	ZACC	Act,	the	
President	cannot	override	the	disqualification,	even	if	he	believes	that	the	individual	would	
be	suitable	for	the	post.24	
The	Commissioners	of	the	ZACC	occupy	a	position	of	trust.	Therefore,	the	ZACC	Act	
disqualifies	any	individuals	who	have	been	convicted	of	any	crimes	involving	dishonesty	in	
																																								 																				
20	 Section	5(a)-(d)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
21	 Section	5(d)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
22			 Section	254(2)	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe,	2013.	
23	 Section	9	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
24			 The	wording	in	section	9(1)	of	the	ZACC	Act	does	not	give	leeway	to	the	President	to	appoint	
individuals	who	have	been	disqualified	from	assuming	the	post	of	Commissioner.	The	terms	“shall	
not”	is	used,	which	indicates	an	absolute	requirement	which	cannot	be	waived.	
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and	outside	Zimbabwe.25	Appointing	Commissioners	who	have	been	convicted	of	crimes	
involving	dishonesty	would	bring	disrepute	to	the	ZACC	and	erode	public	confidence	in	the	
institution.	It	would	also	make	the	ZACC	vulnerable	to	crimes	involving	dishonesty,	which	
would	defeat	the	very	purpose	of	the	institution.	The	ZACC	Act	also	disqualifies	members	of	
parliament	and	members	of	any	statutory	body	from	being	appointed	as	Commissioners	of	
the	ZACC.26	This	provision	ensures	that	the	institution	is	independent	of	other	institutions	
and	of	parliament.	It	maintains	a	level	of	independence	within	the	ZACC.	
The	drafters	of	the	ZACC	Act	could	have	broadened	the	list	of	disqualified	people	to	
include	politically	exposed	individuals.	This,	too,	would	have	helped	to	ensure	that	the	ZACC	
remains	independent.	However,	it	may	have	been	challenging,	as	politically	exposed	
persons	are	not	always	known	to	the	public.	Conversely,	individuals	who	are	not	politically	
exposed	may	be	accused	of	being	politically	exposed,	which	could	lead	to	great	candidates	
being	disqualified	maliciously.	In	order	to	ensure	that	non-partisan	Commissioners	are	
appointed,	the	ZACC	Act	should	have	disqualified	active	political	party	members.	However,	
the	drafters	of	the	ZACC	Act	may	not	have	included	this	provision	as	it	may	violate	an	
individual’s	right	to	freedom	of	association.	
Zimbabwe	fosters	a	culture	of	excluding	youth	from	decision-making	positions	in	the	
country.27	Age	discrimination	is	rife,	with	age	being	prioritised	over	experience	and	
expertise.	The	ZACC	Act	shows	Zimbabwe’s	affinity	for	excluding	the	youth	from	leadership	
positions	as	it	disqualifies	individuals	below	the	age	of	forty	from	being	appointed	as	
Commissioners	of	the	ZACC.28	Appointing	young,	qualified	and	experienced	Commissioners	
could	lead	to	the	development	of	new	ideas,	such	as	digitisation	of	the	ZACC,	which	could	
produce	a	more	efficient	ACA	for	Zimbabwe.	
The	ZACC	Act	governs	the	removal	of	Commissioners	from	the	ZACC.29	
Commissioners	must	vacate	their	offices	if	they	conduct	themselves	in	a	manner	which	
																																								 																				
25	 Section	9(e)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
26	 Section	9(2)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
27	 An	example	of	this	is	visible	from	the	2018	Presidential	elections,	when	there	was	an	attempt	to	raise	
the	Presidential	age	limit	from	40	to	50	years.	This	was	done	to	bar	Presidential	candidates	who	were	
in	their	forties.	The	motion	was	debated	heavily	but	ultimately	failed.	
28	 Section	9(1)(b)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
29	 Section	10	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
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renders	them	unsuitable	to	continue	as	a	member	of	the	ZACC.30	This	is	a	broad	provision	in	
the	ZACC	Act	and	it	is	unclear	what	conduct	would	be	considered	inappropriate.	The	
provision	might	be	utilised	wrongly	to	remove	unpopular	Commissioners	who	speak	out	
against	the	ruling	party.	Conversely,	the	catch-all	provision	caters	for	possible	scenarios	that	
the	drafters	of	the	ZACC	Act	may	not	have	envisioned,	but	which	could	render	a	
Commissioner	unfit	for	office.	
The	office	of	a	Commissioner	may	be	terminated	also	for	absence	from	three	
consecutive	meetings	without	permission.31	This	is	because	the	ZACC	meetings	constitute	a	
large	portion	of	the	work	that	Commissioners	do.	The	meetings	are	a	platform	to	map	out	
the	work	of	the	ZACC	and	thus	form	an	integral	part	of	a	Commissioner’s	work.	Failure	to	
attend	meetings	would	mean	that	a	Commissioner	is	not	doing	the	work	that	he	was	
appointed	to	do.	Mental	and	physical	incapability	are	grounds	for	termination,	according	to	
the	ZACC	Act.32	These	are	grounds	that	are	accepted	across	most	labour	practices	around	
the	world.	
The	ZACC	Act	again	gives	the	President	a	lot	of	power	in	relation	to	the	termination	
of	the	office	of	ZACC	Commissioners.	Evidence	of	this	can	be	found	in	the	President’s	power	
to	select	individuals	onto	the	disciplinary	committee	of	the	ZACC,33	which	could	make	the	
disciplinary	committee	biased	and	lead	to	the	retention	or	removal	of	Commissioners	
according	to	their	relationship	with	the	President.	The	Commissioners	may	be	removed	also	
when	they	do	not	comply	with	the	terms	which	the	President	has	fixed.34	The	power	given	
to	the	President	erodes	the	ZACC’s	independence	and	does	not	comply	with	the	
international	best	practice.	
3.2.3	 Mandate,	Functions	and	Powers	of	the	ZACC	
The	ZACC	is	in	line	with	international	best	practice	as	regards	its	clear	and	well-defined	
mandate	that	helps	it	fight	corruption.	Its	powers	and	duties	are	derived	from	Article	108A	
of	the	Constitution,	from	sections	11	and	13	of	the	Ethics	and	Anti-Corruption	Commission	
																																								 																				
30	 Section	10(2)(a)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
31	 Section	10(2)(d)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
32	 Section	10(2)(c)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
33	 Section	10(1)(c)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
34	 Section	10(2)(b)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
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Act	and	from	the	Anti-Corruption	and	Economic	Crimes	Act.	The	ZACC	Act	states	that	the	
objects	of	the	ZACC	are	to	promote	the	investigation	of	corruption,	make	proposals	on	the	
elimination	of	corruption	in	both	the	public	and	private	sectors,	raise	public	awareness	of	
the	causes	and	effects	of	corruption,	and	propose	new	administrative	ways	to	run	the	
ZACC.35	The	ZACC	Act	thus	gives	the	ZACC	a	broad	mandate	enabling	it	to	fight	corruption	
through	investigations,	prevention	and	education.	
The	ZACC	Act	goes	further	than	just	specifying	the	objects	of	the	ZACC.	It	includes	a	
list	of	wide-ranging	functions	which	the	ZACC	must	perform	in	order	to	combat	corruption	in	
Zimbabwe.36	It	could	be	argued	that	the	ZACC’s	broad	functions	have	had	a	negative	impact	
on	its	ability	to	combat	corruption.	The	ZACC	could	be	considered	a	jack-of-all-trades	and	a	
master	of	none.	It	has	executed	none	of	its	functions	well,	possibly	because	it	is	
overburdened	with	too	many	functions.	The	ZACC	Act	lists	nine	functions	of	the	ZACC,	which	
include	advising	the	government	on	the	anti-corruption	instruments	which	the	country	
needs	to	ratify.37	The	nine	functions	listed	in	the	ZACC	Act	are	not	exhaustive	because	the	
Act	gives	the	ZACC	the	power	to	propose	new	or	effective	ways	to	ensure	that	its	
administration	runs	effectively.38	When	this	provision	is	considered,	the	ZACC	enjoys	a	level	
of	independence	in	deciding	how	it	will	run	as	a	corruption-fighting	institution.	
The	ZACC	Act	gives	the	ZACC	broad	powers	to	enable	it	to	fight	corruption	
effectively.	However,	these	powers	have	not	enabled	the	ZACC	to	achieve	its	mandate	as	
envisioned	by	the	drafters	of	the	ZACC	Act.	The	powers	which	been	conferred	upon	the	
ZACC	sometimes	requires	co-operation	from	the	police,	the	national	prosecuting	authority	
and	the	attorney	general’s	office.	An	example	of	this	is	that	a	ZACC	Commissioner	is	
required	to	be	accompanied	by	a	police	officer	during	the	search	and	seizure	of	property	
belonging	to	individuals	suspected	of	corruption	crimes.39	Furthermore,	the	ZACC’s	arresting	
power	has	been	a	heavily	debated	and	contentious	issue	in	the	ZACC’s	case	against	
Zimbabwe’s	former	Higher	and	Tertiary	Education	Minister,	Jonathan	Moyo,	and	his	Deputy,	
Godfrey	Gandawa.	The	ZACC	accused	Moyo	of	conniving	with	Gandawa	and	some	officials	
																																								 																				
35	 Section	11	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
36	 Section	12	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
37	 Section	12(i)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
38	 Section	11(d)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
39	 Section	13(4)(b)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
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within	his	Ministry	to	syphon	more	than	US$400	000	from	the	Zimbabwe	Manpower	
Development	Fund	(ZIMDEF)	for	personal	gain.	This	resulted	in	Moyo’s	arrest,	which	he	
challenged	in	the	Constitutional	Court	of	Zimbabwe,	arguing	that	the	ZACC	had	no	powers	
of	arrest.	The	Constitutional	Court	held	that	the	ZACC	indeed	had	no	arresting	powers,	but	
that	a	police	officer	seconded	to	the	ZACC	had	the	power	to	arrest.40	This	case	shows	that	
the	ZACC	heavily	relies	on	the	assistance	of	other	institutions	to	carry	out	its	work	
effectively.	
The	ZACC	Act	also	states	that	where	the	ZACC	seeks	to	freeze	the	assets	of	an	
individual	suspected	of	corruption,	an	application	must	be	made	through	the	attorney	
general’s	office.41	The	ZACC’s	reliance	on	the	police	and	attorney	general’s	office	in	
executing	some	of	its	powers	does	not	make	it	subordinate	to	these	institutions.	The	
reliance	upon	other	institutions	derives	largely	from	the	fact	that	the	ZACC	is	based	on	the	
universal	model	of	ACA,	which	encompasses	an	array	of	functions	that	include	law	
enforcement,	investigation	and	prevention	of	corruption.	However,	the	ZACC	does	not	have	
a	police	force	of	its	own	nor	does	it	have	a	specialised	corruption	court	within	it.	Hence,	in	
order	to	fulfil	all	the	functions	which	it	is	mandated	to	perform,	it	must	rely	on	the	police	
and	the	judiciary	for	help.	
Co-operation	is	encouraged	for	the	efficient	running	of	an	ACA,	and	the	ZACC	Act	
stipulates	co-operation	between	the	police,	the	judiciary	and	the	ZACC	itself.	Co-operation,	
in	this	case,	ensures	that	the	ZACC	can	fulfil	all	its	allocated	functions	without	actual	
investment	being	needed	to	create	a	separate	corruption	court	and	to	establish	an	anti-
corruption	police	force.	Zimbabwe	is	a	developing	nation	and	its	budget	may	not	have	been	
able	to	sustain	a	separate	corruption	court	and	an	anti-corruption	police	force.	Co-
operation,	therefore,	was	essential.	However,	without	the	power	to	arrest	and	prosecute,	
the	ZACC	is	viewed	as	a	toothless	bulldog.	It	has	conducted	many	investigations,	but	few	
reach	the	stage	of	prosecution,	because	the	national	prosecuting	authority	can	derail	the	
cases	that	the	ZACC	wants	to	pursue.	
																																								 																				
40	 Moyo	v	Sgt	Chacha	and	others	(CCZ	19/17,	Constitutional	Application	No	CCZ	73/16)	[2017]	ZWCC	19.	
41	 Schedule	1,	section	13(4)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
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The	ZACC	Act	does	not	include	a	provision	on	co-operation	with	non-governmental	
organisations	and	civil	society.	This	may	be	considered	an	oversight	by	the	drafters.	
However,	this	is	not	detrimental	to	the	efficient	running	of	the	ZACC,	which	is	empowered	
to	decide	how	it	will	run	effectively	as	an	institution.	This	means	that	it	can	co-operate	with	
civil	society	if	it	so	chooses.	
3.2.4	 ZACC	Meetings	
The	ZACC	Act	does	not	regulate	strictly	all	aspects	of	the	Commission’s	operations.	An	
example	of	this	is	the	fact	that	the	Act	does	not	stipulate	how	often	the	Commission	should	
meet.	This	decision	is	left	to	the	Chairperson	of	the	ZACC.42	Furthermore,	there	is	no	
guidance	on	how	meetings	should	proceed,	giving	the	Commissioners	leeway	to	regulate	
the	procedure	of	meetings.43	It	can	be	argued	that	the	ability	to	regulate	its	own	procedure	
enables	the	ZACC	to	be	flexible,	which	is	necessary	to	tackle	any	urgent	corruption	scandals	
that	may	emerge	in	the	country.	The	Commissioners	can	call	meetings	as	they	see	fit	and	
thus	deal	quickly	with	urgent	issues.	The	disadvantage	of	allowing	Commissioners	to	
regulate	when	and	how	often	they	meet	is	that	an	inadequate	number	of	meetings	may	be	
held	through	the	year.	This	could	lead	to	the	inefficient	running	of	the	Commission.	
Therefore,	in	striking	a	balance,	the	drafters	of	the	ZACC	Act	ought	to	have	stipulated	a	
minimum	number	of	meetings	that	the	Commissioners	are	expected	to	have.	
Although	the	Act	does	not	regulate	how	meetings	are	to	be	conducted,	it	does	
stipulate	the	quorum	required	for	meetings	as	the	Chairperson	or	the	Deputy	Chairperson	
plus	three	other	Commissioners.44	This	quorum	is	necessary	because	the	Act	requires	that	
any	decisions	made	during	a	meeting	must	be	decided	by	the	majority	of	the	Commissioners	
present.45	However,	in	the	event	of	a	split	vote,	the	deciding	vote	lies	with	the	Chairperson	
or	the	Deputy	Chairperson.46	
																																								 																				
42	 Section	15(1)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
43	 Section	15(5)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
44	 Section	15(2)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
45	 Section	15(3)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
46	 Section	15(3)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
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The	Act	permits	the	Commissioners	to	invite	outside	experts	to	attend	meetings	to	
offer	them	guidance	on	any	issues	on	which	they	may	need	expert	opinion.47	The	invited	
individual	has	no	power	to	vote	on	issues	that	may	be	raised	in	the	meetings	at	which	he	is	
in	attendance.48	The	power	to	call	in	experts	ensures	that	the	ZACC	can	obtain	specialist	
advice	on	any	issues	relating	to	its	work	about	which	the	Commissioners	may	not	have	in-
depth	knowledge.	The	ZACC	Act	also	permits	a	committee	to	be	selected	to	undertake	tasks	
as	the	Commissioners	see	fit.49	This	is	advantageous	as	it	allows	the	Commissioners	to	seek	
outside	help	where	needs	be.	It	would	assist	in	ensuring	that	the	Commission	runs	
effectively.	
3.2.5	 Reports	of	the	ZACC	
The	Constitution	gives	the	ZACC	the	power	to	produce	and	present	any	reports	of	“improper	
conduct”	by	government	officials	or	members	of	the	private	sector.50	The	power	to	name	
and	shame	is	a	powerful	tool	that	the	ZACC	can	utilise	to	pressure	government	and	corrupt	
companies	into	initiating	change.	It	can	drive	policy	changes	to	ensure	a	positive	public	
image.	The	ZACC	Act	does	not	provide	the	ZACC	with	full	autonomy	regarding	the	reports	
which	they	publish.	It	requires	that	the	Commissioners	produce	a	report	annually	which	is	
presented	to	parliament.51	This	must	be	done	through	the	appropriate	Minister.52	The	
Minister	may	request	that	the	ZACC	produce	additional	reports	and	any	report	must	be	
given	to	the	Minister	before	it	is	published.53	This	provision	takes	away	some	independence	
from	the	ZACC	because,	although	the	Act	states	that	the	ZACC	may	release	its	reports	as	it	
sees	fit,	if	the	Minister	does	not	agree	with	the	contents	of	a	report	he	or	she	may	exert	
political	pressure	to	have	the	report	changed	or	not	published	at	all.	The	drafters	of	the	
ZACC	Act	did	not	include	a	provision	which	prescribes	that	the	reports	produced	by	the	
Commission	be	made	available	to	the	public.	The	Act	only	requires	that	reports	be	
																																								 																				
47	 Section	15(4)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
48	 Section	15(4)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
49	 Section	16(1)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
50	 Section	257	of	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe,	2013.	
51	 Section	17(1)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
52	 At	the	inception	of	the	ZACC,	the	appropriate	Minister	was	the	Minister	of	Home	Affairs.	However,	
the	ZACC	since	has	been	removed	from	the	Home	Affairs	Ministry.	It	has	not	been	allocated	to	a	
different	Ministry,	which	has	resulted	in	any	Minister	being	able	to	meddle	in	the	affairs	of	the	ZACC.	
53	 Section	17(1)(a)	and	17(4)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
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presented	to	the	Minister	who	may	add	comments	as	he	sees	fit.54	This	deprives	the	work	of	
the	ZACC	of	transparency	and	it	could	lose	the	public’s	confidence	if	it	is	seen	not	to	be	
working	actively	to	combat	corruption.	The	ZACC	has	failed	to	produce	and	present	reports	
regularly	to	parliament,	but	of	great	concern	is	parliament’s	failure	to	question	the	ZACC	on	
its	failures	in	this	regard.	This	omission	suggests	that	the	fight	against	corruption	is	not	a	
priority	for	parliament.	Parliament	has	failed	to	check	on	the	work	which	the	ZACC	is	
mandated	to	do.	This	lack	of	oversight	contributes	to	the	ZACC’s	inefficiencies.	
3.2.6	 Funds	of	the	ZACC	
The	efficient	running	of	an	ACA	requires	adequate	financial	resources.55	The	ZACC	Act	does	
not	provide	details	of	how	the	ZACC	should	be	funded.	It	offers	guidance	on	how	the	funds	
of	the	ZACC	should	be	handled,	such	as	requiring	that	proper	books	of	accounts	be	kept.56	
This	is	important	as	the	proper	handling	of	accounts	means	that	the	funds	allocated	to	the	
ZACC	are	less	likely	to	be	stolen.	However,	the	legislature	should	have	been	more	precise	in	
stating	how	the	allocation	of	funds	to	the	ZACC	by	the	government	should	take	place.	
Ensuring	that	ACAs	are	well	funded	is	an	international	best	practice	which	assists	them	to	
conduct	their	work	and	achieve	their	mandate.	One	of	the	major	problems	that	the	ZACC	
faces	is	a	lack	of	sufficient	funding.57	This	could	have	been	avoided	had	the	legislature	
ensured	that	the	ZACC	Act	provides	for	sufficient	and	guaranteed	funding	for	the	efficient	
running	of	the	ZACC.	
3.3	 Structural	and	Institutional	Challenges	
The	ZACC	faces	a	number	of	structural	and	institutional	challenges.	These	could	be	
mitigated	by	some	amendments	to	the	ZACC	Act,	which	forms	the	foundation	upon	which	
the	ZACC	operates.	This	section	looks	beyond	the	ZACC	Act	and	analyses	some	of	the	
structural	and	institutional	challenges	with	which	the	ZACC	has	to	contend.	
	 	
																																								 																				
54	 Section	17(6)(b)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
55	 Jakarta	Statement	on	Principles	for	Anti-Corruption	Agencies	(2012).	
56	 Section	18(3)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
57	 Langa	(2017),	available	at	https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/04/underfunding-stifles-zacc-
operations/	(visited	29	November	2018).	
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
	 33	
3.3.1	 Interaction	with	the	Public	and	Parliament	
Corruption	is	a	clandestine	activity,	which	makes	the	public	an	essential	tool	in	fighting	it.	
Members	of	the	public	are	needed	to	report	the	corruption	they	know	of	or	witness.	
However,	the	ZACC	Act	does	not	have	provisions	that	guarantee	support	for	whistleblowers.	
Without	guaranteed	protection,	citizens	are	unwilling	to	report	corruption.	The	ZACC	has	
made	efforts	to	encourage	the	public	to	expose	corruption	through	its	public	education	and	
publicity	campaign.58	This	has	been	done	through	advertisements	on	local	television	and	
radio.	However,	without	guaranteed	protection,	people	are	unwilling	to	report	corruption	
and,	as	a	result,	the	ZACC	has	minimal	interaction	with	the	public.	The	government	has	
stated	that	it	is	working	on	implementing	whistleblower	protection	laws.59	The	ZACC	only	
has	one	branch	in	Harare,	the	capital	city;	it	has	not	opened	other	branches	due	to	financial	
constraints.60	This	further	alienates	it	from	the	public	as	it	is	not	accessible	physically	to	a	
large	portion	of	Zimbabwe’s	population.	
As	discussed	earlier,	the	ZACC	has	direct	access	to	parliament,	which	access,	if	
utilised,	could	be	a	powerful	tool	to	name	and	shame	corrupt	individuals	and	private	
corporations.	The	ZACC	could	not	do	this	as	reports	have	to	go	through	a	Minister	before	
they	are	presented	to	parliament.61	The	Minister	concerned	can	prevent	information	from	
reaching	parliament	and	has	the	power	to	prevent	the	presentation	of	reports	to	parliament	
and	the	public.	This	is	a	major	challenge	for	the	ZACC,	as	its	work	may	be	quashed	by	the	
Minister	who	may	not	agree	with	the	contents	of	its	reports.	It	may	be	argued	also	that	
having	a	report	pass	through	a	Minister	before	presentation	to	parliament	may	make	the	
Commissioners	hesitant	to	confront	acts	of	corruption	by	senior	government	officials	who	
may	be	in	the	good	books	of	the	Minister	in	charge.	The	effectiveness	of	the	ZACC	thus	is	
reduced.	
	 	
																																								 																				
58	 Chikukwa	(2018),	available	at	https://www.herald.co.zw/zacc-rolls-out-publicity-campaigh/	(visited	20	
November	2018).	
59	 Langa	(2014),	available	at	https://www.newsday.co.zw/2014/07/10/govt-still-crafting-
whistleblowers-act/	(visited	30	December	2018).	
60	 Nkala	(2013),	available	at	https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2013/02/17/zacc-fails-to-open-new-
offices/	(visited	2	January	2019).	
61	 Section	17(1)	of	the	ZACC	Act.	
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3.3.2	 Lack	of	an	Independent	Budget	
The	lack	of	independent	budget	allocation	for	the	ZACC	is	a	major	flaw	in	both	the	ZACC	Act	
and	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe.	An	effective	ACA	requires	a	generous	budget	to	fund	its	
activities	and	to	fulfil	its	mandate	of	combating	corruption.62	This	is	recognised	as	an	
international	best	practice.	The	ZACC	falls	short	significantly	in	this	aspect	because,	ever	
since	its	inception,	it	has	not	been	allocated	its	full	budget	request	by	the	treasury.	The	
budget	allocation	over	the	years	has	fallen	below	twenty	percent	of	the	requested	
amount.63	
In	the	2019	Zimbabwe	budget	statement,	the	ZACC	was	allocated	US$5	million	
dollars.64	This	is	significantly	lower	than	the	requested	budget	allocation,	which	is	estimated	
to	have	been	over	US$9	million.65	Poor	funding	has	crippled	the	ZACC’s	ability	to	achieve	its	
mandate	of	combating	corruption.	The	money	received	from	the	treasury	is	often	enough	to	
pay	salaries	only.	It	does	not	cover	the	expense	of	conducting	thorough	investigations	or	
anti-corruption	campaigns	across	the	country.	An	independent	budget	would	enable	the	
ZACC	to	carry	out	its	functions	effectively.	It	is	imperative	for	Zimbabwe	to	invest	in	its	anti-
corruption	strategies,	as	a	large	portion	of	the	country’s	wealth	is	lost	to	corruption.	
Adequate	investment	in	the	ZACC	could	reduce	corruption	and	lead	to	retention	of	the	
country’s	wealth.	
3.3.3	 Political	Support	
The	ZACC	has	been	facing	major	setbacks	because	it	has	been	accused	of	investigating	
citizens	selectively.	This	ultimately	has	a	negative	impact	on	its	ability	to	combat	corruption	
in	Zimbabwe.	The	ZACC	focuses	on	investigating	petty	issues	while	neglecting	the	“big	fish”.	
The	most	corrupt	individuals	in	Zimbabwe	are	not	investigated	because	of	their	political	
links	or	financial	muscle.	
																																								 																				
62	 Jakarta	Statement	on	Principles	for	Anti-Corruption	Agencies	(2012).	
63	 Katongomara	(2018),	available	at	https://www.chronicle.co.zw/zacc-operations-under-threat/	(visited	
4	November	2018).	
64	 Zimbabwe	National	Budget	Statement	(2019)	at	168.	
65		 Langa	(2017),	available	at	https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/04/underfunding-stifles-zacc-
operations/	(visited	24	April	2019).	
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Critics	have	argued	that	the	largest	drawback	in	the	fight	against	corruption	in	
Zimbabwe	is	the	lack	of	political	will	on	the	part	of	the	political	elite.66	Political	support	is	
essential	to	the	effectiveness	of	an	ACA.	The	ZACC’s	need	for	political	support	is	
exacerbated	by	its	lack	of	complete	independence.	Being	subsumed	under	the	Office	of	the	
President	can	be	viewed	as	a	hindrance	to	independence,	which	may	cause	a	lack	of	
objectivity	in	investigating	its	parent	ministry	when	the	need	arises.	The	ZACC’s	lack	of	
objectivity	is	evidenced	by	its	inability	to	investigate	corruption	orchestrated	by	high-
ranking	members	of	the	ruling	party.	Such	investigations	are	pursued	only	when	the	
suspects	are	no	longer	members	of	the	ruling	party.	This	is	illustrated	by	the	case	of	Ignatius	
Chombo,	the	former	finance	minister	of	Zimbabwe,	who	was	charged	with	several	criminal	
and	corruption	charges	after	the	removal	of	Robert	Mugabe	from	power.67	The	corruption	
did	not	start	after	the	removal	of	Mugabe,	but	the	removal	gave	the	ZACC	the	confidence	to	
investigate	Chombo	without	fear	of	being	reprimanded	by	the	President.	This	shows	both	
severe	bias	and	lack	of	independence.	
It	must	be	noted	also	that	the	ZACC	lacks	adequate	legal	support,	independence	and	
budget,	all	of	which	are	indicators	of	a	severe	lack	of	political	support.	The	lack	of	political	
support	is	blatant.	When	the	ZACC	tried	to	investigate	corruption	in	the	mining	industry	in	
2013,	the	state	promptly	arrested	some	Commissioners.68	In	2016,	after	the	ZACC	
investigated	certain	parastatals	and	the	Harare	City	Council	for	fraud	and	disregard	of	
tender	procedures,	former	President	Mugabe's	spokesperson,	George	Charamba,	
announced	to	the	media	that	the	ZACC	was	impugning	government	systems	and	
circumventing	ministries,	and	warned	it	not	to	act	on	insufficient	information.69	These	
examples	illustrate	that,	although	the	government	purports	to	support	the	efforts	of	the	
ZACC	to	fight	corruption,	it	equally	frustrates	any	initiatives	it	undertakes	to	achieve	its	
mandate.	Without	political	support,	an	effective	ZACC	remains	a	pipe	dream.	
																																								 																				
66	 OSISA	(2017)	at	362.	
67	 Bhebhe	(2018),	available	at	https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/28227-latest-on-ex-finance-
minister-ignatius-chombo-who-is-facing-several-corruption-charges.html	(visited	30	December	2018).	
68	 Moyo	(2013),	available	at	https://www.theindependent.co.zw/minister-unleash-fierce-backlash/	
(visited	2	January	2019).	
69	 Share	(2016),	available	at	https://www.herald.co.zw/anti-graft-body-warned-on-haste/	(visited	28	
November	2018).	
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3.3.4	 Corrupt	Commissioners	
The	epitome	of	the	ZACC’s	dysfunction	is	the	multiple	corruption	scandals	involving	ZACC	
Commissioners	themselves.	This	could	be	a	result	of	the	compromised	appointment	
procedure,	which	gives	the	President	a	lot	of	power	to	appoint	the	ZACC	Commissioners.	
The	Zimbabwean	political	elite	often	has	been	accused	of	grand	corruption	and,	because	of	
the	President’s	power	to	appoint	Commissioners,	it	is	often	the	same	politically	exposed	
persons	who	are	appointed	as	Commissioners.	
The	first	known	corruption	scandal	involving	ZACC	Commissioners	occurred	in	2008,	
when	they	corruptly	received	luxury	properties	in	upmarket	areas	from	the	ZACC.70	Property	
corruption	scandals	continued	in	2013,	when	the	ZACC	chief	executive,	Ngonidzashe	
Gumbo,	was	arrested	on	an	allegation	of	defrauding	the	Commission	of	US$435	000.	He	was	
accused	of	making	secret	profits	from	a	transaction	involving	a	ZACC	property.	Gumbo	was	
found	guilty	and	sentenced	to	an	effective	two	years	in	prison	in	March	2015.71	In	2014,	it	
emerged	that	a	ZACC	investigator,	Courage	Nyamajiwa,	was	paid	by	the	Zimbabwe	Football	
Association	(ZIFA)	for	work	he	was	doing	for	the	ZACC	against	ZIFA	officials.	It	was	reported	
that	this	suggested	there	was	undue	collusion	between	the	two	organisations	in	handling	
this	issue.72	
The	frequency	of	corruption	within	the	ZACC	itself	is	alarming.	Such	corruption	could	
be	exacerbated	by	the	limited	budget	allocated	to	the	ZACC,	since	a	small	budget	negatively	
affects	the	remuneration	that	Commissioners	receive.	This	makes	Commissioners	turn	to	
corruption	to	supplement	their	incomes.	The	problem	of	corrupt	Commissioners	could	be	
reduced	by	adequate	funding	for	the	ZACC	and	the	appointment	of	honest	and	highly	
qualified	individuals	as	Commissioners.	
	 	
																																								 																				
70	 Magaisa	(2016),	available	at	http://alexmagaisa.com/big-saturday-read-last-dance-sunset-
zimbabwes-political-elite-looting-state-citizens-can/	(visited	30	December	2018).	
71	 Nemukuyu	(2015),	available	at	http://www.herald.co.zw/anti-corruption-commission-boss-jailed/	
(visited	30	December	2018).	
72	 Rushwaya	(2016),	available	at	http://www.herald.co.zw/how-did-zifa-pay-a-zacc-investigator/	(visited	
5	January	2019).	
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3.4	 Successes	of	the	ZACC	
Although	the	ZACC	has	faced	multiple	challenges	since	its	inception,	it	has	had	a	few	
successes	in	the	fight	against	corruption	in	Zimbabwe.	The	ZACC	does	not	have	many	anti-
corruption	cases	under	its	belt.	However,	its	most	notable	case	involved	unearthing	the	FIFA	
match-fixing	scandals	of	2011.	The	ZACC’s	investigations	into	the	matter	implicated	ZIFA,	
which	led	to	the	arrest	and	prosecution	of	its	former	CEO.	This	case	was	a	major	victory	for	
the	ZACC.	
Besides	investigations,	the	ZACC	has	played	an	advisory	role.	It	has	conducted	
research	and	investigations	into	the	prevalence	of	corruption	in	Zimbabwe	but	has	failed	to	
publish	reports	on	its	findings.	The	lack	of	public	reporting	keeps	the	work	of	the	ZACC	
hidden	from	the	public,	which	fuels	the	“toothless	bulldog”	narrative	that	plagues	the	
Commission.	The	ZACC	also	played	a	key	role	in	developing	the	National	Corporate	
Governance	Code,	which	has	been	instrumental	in	Zimbabwe’s	private	sector.	The	ZACC	
needs	to	do	more	advisory	work	and	ensure	that	the	public	is	kept	informed	of	its	work.	A	
good	relationship	with	the	country’s	media	houses	would	shine	a	light	on	some	of	the	
positive	work	which	the	ZACC	does.	
3.5	 The	Future	of	the	ZACC	
In	May	2018,	President	Mnangagwa	established	a	Special	Anti-Corruption	Unit	(SACU).	The	
legality	of	this	Unit	has	been	debated	heavily,	as	there	is	no	legal	authority	for	its	
establishment.	The	Presidency	also	has	failed	to	give	details	as	to	how	the	SACU	will	work	
with	the	ZACC.	The	introduction	of	the	SACU	may	be	viewed	as	an	acknowledgement	by	the	
President	that	the	ZACC	has	failed	to	achieve	its	mandate.	The	new	Unit	is	housed	in	the	
President’s	office	and	it	is	hoped	that	it	will	improve	the	number	of	prosecutions	in	
corruption-related	crimes.	
However,	its	location	within	the	President’s	office	means	that	the	SACU	lacks	the	
independence	needed	for	an	ACA’s	success.	It	can	be	argued	also	that	the	SACU	can	be	used	
as	a	vehicle	to	thwart	the	work	of	the	ZACC,	as	the	former	will	have	the	final	say	on	the	
prosecutions	that	take	place.	Ultimately,	the	establishment	of	the	SACU	could	lead	to	the	
ZACC	becoming	obsolete.	It	is	unlikely	that	the	ZACC	will	be	shut	down	as	it	is	a	
constitutional	institution.	However,	it	is	possible	that	it	turns	into	an	“empty	shell”	of	an	
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institution,	existing	in	name	but	with	no	substance.	Taking	the	entire	anti-corruption	system	
and	placing	it	under	the	Office	of	the	President	is	a	retrogressive	step	toward	centralising	
and	concentrating	power	in	the	hands	of	one	man.	It	is	a	bad	sign	of	populism	when	one	
person	overrides	established	institutions	in	the	name	of	fighting	corruption.73	
3.6	 Conclusion	
The	ZACC	has	a	solid	legal	framework	supporting	it.	It	has	been	at	the	centre	of	Zimbabwe’s	
anti-corruption	efforts	since	its	inception	in	2004.	Although	the	ZACC	has	had	some	
successes,	these	remain	negligible	when	compared	to	its	failures.	The	ZACC’s	major	
drawbacks	appear	to	be	political	and	institutional.	It	does	not	fulfil	its	mandate	due	to	lack	
of	support	from	the	government	and	its	complementing	state	organs.	Corruption	in	the	
country	continues	to	grow	and	the	future	of	the	ZACC	is	not	guaranteed.	Its	reputation	as	a	
“toothless	bulldog”	has	been	the	catalyst	for	discourse	around	its	removal	as	Zimbabwe’s	
key	anti-corruption	institution.	
	 	
																																								 																				
73	 Magaisa	(2018),	available	at	https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/05/24/trouble-govts-anti-
corruption-organ/	(visited	5	January	2019).	
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CHAPTER	FOUR	
	
CONCLUSION	AND	RECOMMENDATIONS	
	
	
4.1	 Conclusion	
This	research	paper	has	analysed	the	Zimbabwe	Anti-Corruption	Commission	(ZACC).	
According	to	Transparency	International,	Zimbabwe	is	one	of	the	most	corrupt	countries	in	
Africa.	The	corruption	levels	in	the	country	are	discussed	at	length,	which	demonstrates	the	
importance	of	an	ACA	in	Zimbabwe.	An	analysis	of	the	history	of	the	ZACC	since	its	inception	
in	2004	reveals	that	its	development	has	been	driven	largely	by	politics.	Corruption	remains	
a	major	problem	in	Zimbabwe	and	any	change	of	government	shines	fresh	light	on	the	
ZACC,	bringing	new	promises	of	refurbishing	the	ZACC	to	improve	its	ability	to	achieve	its	
mandate.	The	research	paper	has	traversed	Zimbabwe’s	anti-corruption	legal	framework,	
which	is	in	line	with	international	instruments	such	as	UNCAC	and	the	AU	Convention.	
In	an	attempt	to	understand	the	importance	of	ACAs	in	combating	corruption,	this	
research	paper	discussed	how	they	first	developed	and	the	different	models	of	anti-
corruption	bodies	available.	ACAs	can	be	endowed	with	investigative,	preventive,	educative	
and	prosecutorial	powers.	However,	despite	the	existence	of	an	ample	legal	framework	
calling	for	the	creation	of	anti-corruption	bodies	at	international,	regional	and	national	
levels,	there	is	no	edict	on	the	model	to	be	adopted.	Individual	states	have	to	select	a	
suitable	model	for	their	national	context.	Furthermore,	the	legal	framework	pertaining	to	
ACAs	is	silent	on	their	administration	and	management.	
The	international	best	practices	for	ACAs	were	discussed	extensively	in	this	research	
paper.	They	are	based	on	some	of	the	practices	that	effective	ACAs	have	used	and	on	the	
Jakarta	Statement	on	Principles	for	Anti-Corruption	Agencies.	The	research	paper	deduced	
that	currently	there	is	no	binding	instrument	that	ACAs	may	rely	upon	as	a	blueprint	for	the	
best	practices	standard.	Although	the	list	of	international	best	practices	for	ACAs	is	not	
exhaustive,	ensuring	that	an	ACA	is	independent,	accountable,	founded	upon	a	strong	legal	
framework,	has	a	clear	mandate	and	is	well	resourced	will	increase	significantly	its	efficiency	
and	effectiveness.	
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Chapter	Three	of	this	research	paper	examined	the	Anti-Corruption	Commission	Act	
(ZACC	Act),	which	is	the	enabling	statute	of	the	ZACC,	to	establish	whether	it	complies	with	
the	international	best	practice	standards.	In	so	doing,	the	research	revealed	that	the	ZACC	
Act,	to	a	large	extent,	complies	with	ACA	international	best	practice	standards.	However,	
the	implementation	of	the	provisions	of	the	ZACC	Act	is	poor	and	in	matters	involving	the	
appointment	and	removal	of	ZACC	Commissioners,	the	President	of	Zimbabwe	has	been	
given	too	much	power	over	the	ZACC.	This	affects	the	ZACC’s	independence	and,	ultimately,	
its	ability	to	carry	out	its	mandate	effectively.	
The	research	paper	also	assessed	the	ZACC	as	an	institution.	Its	different	features,	
including	the	appointment	of	its	Commissioners	and	members	of	staff,	its	powers	and	
duties,	its	independence,	its	accountability	and	its	funding,	were	discussed.	The	areas	in	
want	of	improvement	were	highlighted.	In	particular,	the	ZACC’s	need	for	sufficient	funding	
and	constant	reporting	were	amongst	the	features	that	demanded	the	most	improvement.	
In	addition	to	discussing	the	structural	and	institutional	challenges	faced	by	the	ZACC,	the	
research	paper	highlighted	some	of	the	successes	of	the	ZACC.	The	strengths	of	the	ZACC	
include	research	and	investigations	into	the	prevalence	of	corruption	in	Zimbabwe.	It	is	clear	
that	much	needs	to	be	done	to	improve	the	efficacy	of	the	ZACC.	
4.2	 Recommendations	
4.2.1	 Remodelling	the	ZACC	
Remodelling	the	ZACC	is	perhaps	the	best	way	to	ensure	a	more	effective	ACA.	This	is	
because,	over	the	years,	the	universal	model	adopted	by	the	ZACC	has	proved	unsuccessful	
due	to	various	external	and	internal	factors.	A	complete	overhaul	may	be	the	ZACC’s	only	
chance	of	success.	This	would	require	a	significant	amount	of	work	from	the	legislature	as	it	
would	need	to	redraft	the	ZACC	Act.	The	use	of	consultants	with	expert	knowledge	of	ACAs	
would	ensure	that	the	new	piece	of	legislation	is	not	only	compliant	with	international	best	
practice	standards	but	also	is	compatible	with	Zimbabwe’s	unique	circumstances.	In	
addition	to	drafting	a	new	ZACC	Act,	there	would	be	a	need	for	a	constitutional	amendment	
that	ensures	that	section	254	of	the	Constitution	of	Zimbabwe	is	in	line	with	the	remodelled	
ZACC.	
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The	universal	model	forms	the	blueprint	of	the	ZACC.	This	model	has	made	the	ZACC	
a	jack-of-all-trades	and	a	master	of	none.	The	model	requires	a	significant	amount	of	
resources,	time	and	expertise.	The	broad	mandate	associated	with	the	universal	model	is	
not	suitable	in	a	country	with	high	levels	of	grand	corruption,	lack	of	political	will	and	
economic	turmoil,	as	these	put	the	model	at	a	high	risk	of	failure,	which	is	the	case	with	
Zimbabwe.	Limiting	the	powers	of	the	ZACC	would	make	it	appear	weaker	to	the	public.	This	
is	largely	because	a	broader	mandate	is	associated	with	more	power.	However,	the	ZACC’s	
perceived	weakness	that	comes	with	a	limited	mandate	is	not	any	worse	than	its	current	
reputation	of	being	a	“toothless	bulldog”.	
The	ZACC	could	be	remodelled	into	a	preventive	ACA,	engaging	in	activities	such	as	
nationwide	anti-corruption	campaigns,	collecting	witness	testimonies,	subpoenaing	
documents,	holding	public	hearings	and	issuing	reports.	The	remodelled	ZACC	could	
produce	reports	that	are	not	necessarily	interpreted	through	the	lens	of	criminal	justice.	The	
reports	could	focus	on	ethical	lapses	and	systemic	weaknesses,	rather	than	the	presence	or	
absence	of	grounds	for	criminal	charges.	It	is	recommended	also	that	the	Minister	of	Home	
Affairs	be	stripped	of	his	power	to	review	the	ZACC	reports	before	their	publication.	This	
change	could	result	in	more	reports	being	published	with	their	original	contents	and	which	
are	free	of	political	bias.	Consistent	publishing	of	reports	could	improve	the	image	of	the	
ZACC	in	the	eyes	of	the	Zimbabwean	public,	as	reports	containing	damning	evidence	of	
corruption	would	show	the	public	that	the	ZACC	is	not	merely	a	shell	of	an	ACA.	
The	more	streamlined	ZACC	would	require	fewer	resources	and	enable	it	to	curtail	
the	growing	corruption	culture	in	Zimbabwe.	An	example	of	a	preventive	ACA	against	which	
the	ZACC	could	be	remodelled	is	Slovenia’s	Commission	for	the	Prevention	of	Corruption	
(CPC).	The	CPC	relies	solely	on	its	powers	of	subpoena	and	issuing	reports	that	previously	
have	exposed	entrenched	corruption	among	the	political	and	economic	elites	of	Slovenia,	a	
country	perceived	as	relatively	free	of	corruption.1	The	CPC’s	findings	sparked	a	nationwide	
protest	movement	that	toppled	the	government,	forced	major	government	and	opposition	
leaders	to	resign,	and	prompted	major	reforms.2	Remodelling	the	ZACC	into	a	preventive	
ACA	would	mean	that	it	would	no	longer	have	investigative	powers	or	powers	to	
																																								 																				
1	 Kuris	(2015)	at	4.	
2	 Kuris	(2015)	at	4.	
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recommend	prosecutions.	However,	this	cannot	be	seen	as	a	major	disadvantage	for	the	
ZACC	because,	to	date,	it	has	not	been	able	to	use	its	powers	of	arrest	and	prosecution	
effectively.	These	dormant	powers	have	affected	the	reputation	of	the	ZACC	adversely.	
Over	time	the	ZACC	could	rebuild	its	reputation	as	an	effective	tool	for	combating	
corruption	in	Zimbabwe,	albeit	with	a	more	limited	mandate.	The	ZACC	could	focus	on	
collecting	witness	testimony,	subpoenaing	documents,	holding	public	hearings,	issuing	
reports	and	conducting	anti-corruption	educational	campaigns.	
4.2.2	 Independent	Source	of	Funding	
The	ZACC	would	benefit	greatly	from	having	an	independent	source	of	funding.	This	would	
make	it	less	dependent	on	Zimbabwe’s	treasury,	which	has	failed	to	provide	sufficient	
funding	to	date.	An	independent	source	of	funding	would	make	the	ZACC	less	dependent	on	
the	treasury	and	thereby	improve	its	independence.	Depending	on	hand-outs	from	the	
treasury	is	untenable.	An	alternative	source	of	funding	could	be	secured	by	amending	
national	laws	to	make	it	mandatory	for	all	proceeds	of	crime,	including	corruption	and	illicit	
enrichment,	to	be	forfeited	to	the	ZACC.	This	not	only	would	supplement	the	funds	which	
the	ZACC	receives	from	the	Zimbabwean	treasury	but	also	would	motivate	the	ZACC	to	
expose	corruption.	
4.2.3	 Engage	and	Encourage	Public	Participation	
The	ZACC	cannot	achieve	its	mandate	of	combating	corruption	without	actively	engaging	
the	citizens	of	Zimbabwe.	The	more	people	who	know	and	understand	its	work,	the	more	
support	the	ZACC	will	obtain.	It	is	extremely	important	for	the	ZACC	to	foster	good	
relationships	with	civil	society	organisations	and	journalists.	They	can	offer	support	to	the	
ZACC.	This	support	could	include	lobbying	government	to	stop	meddling	in	the	
Commission’s	business	and	offering	strategic	litigation	support	by	taking	the	Minister	of	
Finance	to	court	to	ensure	that	he	avails	enough	funds	for	the	ZACC	to	carry	out	its	work	
effectively.	These	are	just	a	few	examples	of	how	partnerships	with	the	public	and	other	
organisations	could	assist	the	ZACC.	
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4.2.4	 Digitalisation	of	the	ZACC	
The	ZACC,	at	the	very	least,	must	have	a	fully	functioning	website	and	active	social	media	
platforms	like	Facebook	and	Twitter.	This	not	only	gives	the	ordinary	citizens	access	to	the	
ACA	but	also	makes	it	possible	for	the	ZACC	to	use	the	platforms	to	educate	the	public	on	
the	detriments	of	corruption.	This	is	a	cheap,	fast	and	efficient	way	of	getting	the	anti-
corruption	message	across	to	many	Zimbabweans.	Furthermore,	an	application	that	
facilitates	anonymous	reporting	of	corrupt	activities	would	increase	the	number	of	
whistleblowers.	
The	digitisation	of	the	ZACC	is	essential	in	combating	the	clandestine	nature	of	
corruption,	as	reports	of	corruption	and	action	being	taken	about	the	reported	incidents	can	
be	part	of	a	public	platform.	The	ZACC	would	become	more	visible	to	the	general	population	
and	this	would	make	it	easier	for	it	to	receive	complaints	of	corruption.	Also,	the	social	
media	platforms,	through	smart	campaigns,	could	be	utilised	to	educate	the	country’s	
population	on	the	ills	of	corruption.	This	may	have	the	effect	of	reducing	petty	corruption	in	
Zimbabwe.	It	also	encourages	accountability	and	transparency,	which	are	essential	elements	
that	the	current	ZACC	lacks.	
4.2.5	 Independent	Oversight	Body	
The	ZACC	has	failed	to	run	efficiently	under	the	watchful	eye	of	Parliament.	This	is	because	
the	parliament	of	Zimbabwe	cannot	be	seen	as	truly	independent,	as	it	serves	largely	to	
protect	the	interests	of	the	ruling	party.	Parliament	has	failed	to	keep	the	ZACC	
accountable:	an	example	of	this	can	be	found	in	its	failure	to	demand	that	the	ZACC	produce	
reports	that	detail	its	work.	
An	independent	oversight	body	would	ensure	that	the	ZACC	runs	more	efficiently.	It	
also	would	limit	the	amount	of	political	influence	experienced	by	the	ZACC.	Such	an	
oversight	body	would	need	to	be	capacitated	through	conscientisation,	training	and	
lobbying,	so	that	it	becomes	more	engaged	and	assertive	on	the	issue	of	corruption.	
However,	the	creation	of	an	independent	body	would	be	very	difficult	since	the	government	
of	Zimbabwe	is	identified	with	capturing	the	so-called	independent	bodies	in	the	country.	It	
is	to	be	hoped	that	the	relationship	with	civil	society	organisations	and	journalists	would	
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assist	in	alleviating	this	problem,	as	they	can	hold	government	to	account	when	the	
designated	oversight	body	is	not	acting	independently.	
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